NOTES

INTRODUCTION: THE FIRST CRISIS OF A GLOBAL AGE

1 . http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/brazil.shtml .

2 . http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/usa_en.pdf .

3 . http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/philippines_en.pdf .

4 . http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/argentina.shtml .

5 . http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/080923_Sarkozy.doc.htm .

6 . http://www.un.org/en/ga/63/generaldebate/pdf/uk_en.pdf .

7 . P. H. Gordon and J. Shapiro, Allies at War: America, Europe, and the Crisis over Iraq (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004).

8 . J. Habermas and J. Derrida, “February 15, or What Binds Europe Together: Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, May 31, 2003, in Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe, ed. D. Levy, M. Pensky, and J. Torpey (London: Verso, 2005).

9 . T. Purdum, “It Came from Wasilla,” Vanity Fair 39 (2009).

10 . G. Jarvie, D. Hwang and M. Brennan, Sport, Revolution, and the Beijing Olympics, (Oxford: Bloomsbury Academic, 2008); and M. E. Price and D. Dayan, Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2011).

11 . G. Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

12 . D. Trump, “Remarks of President Donald J. Trump—As Prepared for Delivery, Inaugural Address” (speech, Washington, DC, January 20, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/inaugural-address ; and for video, http://www.cnn.com/videos/politics/2017/01/20/trump-speech-america-first-sot.cnn .

13 . For an excellent sociopyschological approach to the consequences of the crisis in the United States and Britain, see T. Clark, Hard Times: Inequality, Recession, Aftermath (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014).

14 . A. S. Blinder, After the Music Stopped (New York: Penguin, 2014), is simultaneously the best economist’s account of the crisis and exclusively American. And G. Packer, The Unwinding: An Inner History of the New America (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2013).

15 . In deep agreement with L. Panitchin and S. Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism: The Political Economy of American Empire (London: Verso, 2012); E. S. Prasad, The Dollar Trap: How the US Dollar Tightened Its Grip on Global Finance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); H. M. Schwartz, Subprime Nation: American Power, Global Capital, and the Housing Bubble (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); and P. Gowan, “Crisis in the Heartland,” New Left Review 55 (2009), 5–29.

16 . I. Bremmer, “The Return of State Capitalism,” Survival 50 (2008) 55–64; and J. Gyriel, “The Return of Europe’s Nation-States: The Upside of the EU’s Crisis,” Foreign Affairs 95 (2016), 94.

17 . Attributed to Douglas Adams of Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy fame, the notion of a “sudden stop” was introduced into international economics by way of G. A. Calvo, “Capital Flows and Capital-Market Crises: The Simple Economics of Sudden Stops,” Journal of Applied Economics 1 (November 1998), 35–54.

18 . A. Tooze, Statistics and the German State: The Making of Modern Economic Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and T. Mitchell, Rule of Experts (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

19 . R. Skidelsky, Keynes: The Return of the Master (New York: PublicAffairs, 2010).

20 . Paul Krugman has vigorously and convincingly defended the 1930s-era IS-LM as essential to understanding the mechanics of the recession and the sluggish recovery; see P. Krugman, “IS-LMentary” ( Conscience of a Liberal Blog ), New York Times, October 9, 2011, and “Economics in the Crisis” ( Conscience of a Liberal Blog ), New York Times, March 5, 2012.

21 . R. Baldwin, “Global Supply Chains: Why They Emerged, Why They Matter, and Where They Are Going,” in Global Value Chains in a Changing World, ed. D. K. Elms and P. Low (Geneva: WTO, 2013), 13–60.

22 . H. S. Shin, “Globalisation: Real and Financial,” BIS 87th Annual General Meeting, https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp170625b_slides.pdf .

23 . M. Obstfeld and A. M. Taylor, “International Monetary Relations: Taking Finance Seriously” ( CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12079, June 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2980858 .

24 . Some of the key texts are T. Adrian and H. S. Shin, “Liquidity and Leverage,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 19 (July 2010), 418–437; C. Borio and P. Disyatat, “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Link or No Link?” (BIS Working Paper 346, 2011); and S. Avdjiev, R. N. McCauly and H. S. Shin, “Breaking Free of the Triple Coincidence in International Finance,” Economic Policy 31 (2016), 409–451.

25 . Paradigmatically, D. Yergin and J. Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle for the World Economy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002).

26 . B. Bernanke, “The Great Moderation,” Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC, February 20, 2004.

27 . In place of many, D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

28 . Summarizing a complex multistranded literature, G. Ingham, The Nature of Money (Cambridge: Polity, 2004).

29 . In place of many, A. Roberts, The Logic of Discipline: Global Capitalism and the Architecture of Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

30 . “Re-Thinking the Lender of Last Resort” (BIS Working Paper 79, September 2014), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2504682 .

31 . Whereas the swap lines involving trillions of dollars receive no more than a series of passing mentions, an entire chapter is devoted to AIG in B. Bernanke, Courage to Act (New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), 270–291.

32 . D. Coyle, GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); P. Lepenies, The Power of a Single Number: A Political History of GDP (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016); and T. E. Shenk, “Inventing the American Economy,” Columbia University Academic Commons (PhD, 2016), https://doi.org/10.7916/D8NZ87N1 .

33 . From the French side, this is noted by M. Roche, Histoire secrète d’un krach qui dure (Paris: Albin-Michel, 2016). For the German repression of the crisis, see L. Müller, Bank-Räuber: Wie kriminelle Manager und unfähige Politiker uns in den Ruin treiben (Berlin: Econ, 2010).

34 . See Marco Buti at the European Institute, Columbia, April 2016, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7aGtNbmvmTs .

35 . In refusing to accept that either theories of optimum currency or divergent growth regimes doom the euro and in focusing on finance, the interpretation offered here agrees with M. Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan: The Future of the Euro and the Politics of Debt (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015); E. Jones, “The Forgotten Financial Union: How You Can Have a Euro Crisis Without a Euro,” in The Future of the Euro, ed. M. Matthijs and M. Blyth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); E. Jones, “Getting the Story Right: How You Should Choose Between Different Interpretations of the European Crisis (and Why You Should Care),” Journal of European Integration 37.7 (2015), 817–832; and W. Schelkle, The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity: Understanding the Euro Experiment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

36 . T. Wieser quoted in C. Gammelin and R. Löw, Europas Strippenzieher: Wer in Brüssel Wirklich Regiert (Berlin: Econ, 2014), 65.

37 . M. Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 73.

38 . As acknowledged with admirable frankness in T. F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflections on Financial Crises (New York: Crown, 2015).

39 . For the essential importance of the idea of a “muddle” for Keynesian liberalism, see G. Mann, In the Long Run We Are All Dead: Keynesianism, Political Economy, and Revolution (London: Verso, 2017).

40 . “From Clout to Rout: Why European Companies Have Become a Fading Force in Global Business,” Economist , June 30, 2016.

41 . M. Fratzscher, Die Deutschland-Illusion: Warum wir unsere Wirtschaft überschätzen und Europa brauchen (München: Carl Hanser, 2014); J. Bibow, “The Euro Debt Crisis and Germany’s Euro Trilemma,” Levy Economics Institute (Working Paper 721, May 2012); and S. Dullien, “A German Model for Europe?,” European Council on Foreign Relations , July 2013.

42 . “CSU für Apple, Linke gegen Steuerdeals,” Neues Deutschland , September 1, 2016.

43 . J. B. Stewart, “Deutsche Bank as Next Lehman Brothers: Far-Fetched but Not Unthinkable,” New York Times, October 6, 2016.

44 . C. Goodhart and D. Schoenmaker, “The United States Dominates Global Investment Banking: Does It Matter for Europe?,” Bruegel Policy Contribution (2016).

45 . “Special Report: How Mario Draghi Is Reshaping Europe’s Central Bank,” Reuters, January 9, 2013; and L. Elliott, “Take a Bow Mario Draghi—Has the ECB Chief Saved the Eurozone?,” Guardian, June 8, 2017.

46 . Z. Micah, “The Myth of the Indispensable Nation,” Foreign Policy, November 6, 2014.

47 . D. W. Drexner, The System Worked: How the World Stopped Another Great Depression (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

48 . E. Helleiner, The Status Quo Crisis: Global Financial Governance After the 2008 Meltdown (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

49 . B. Eichengreen, Hall of Mirrors: The Great Depression, the Great Recession, and the Uses and Misuses of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

50 . T. Frank, Listen, Liberal: Or, Whatever Happened to the Party of the People? (New York: Macmillan, 2016).

51 . Among many, two particularly thoughtful pieces are W. Davies, “The Age of Post-Truth Politics, ” New York Times, August 24, 2016; and A. M. Rondón, “Donald Trump’s Fictional America,” Politico, April 2, 2017, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/donald-trumps-fictional-america-post-fact-venezuela-214973 .

52 . C. Forelle, “Luxembourg Lies on Secret Meeting,” Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2011.

CHAPTER 1: THE “WRONG CRISIS”

1 . Conference moderated by P. Orszag, “Restoring America’s Promise of Opportunity, Prosperity and Growth,” Brookings Institution, Washington, DC, 2006, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/Restoring_Americas_Promise_of_Opportunity_Prosperity_and_Growth_Transcript.pdf .

2 . R. Rubin, In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington (New York: Random House, 2003); and N. Prins, All the Presidents’ Bankers: The Hidden Alliances That Drive American Power (New York: Nation Books, 2014).

3 . R. Altman, P. Orszag, J. Bordoff and R. Rubin, “An Economic Strategy to Advance Opportunity, Prosperity, and Growth,” The Hamilton Project, April 2006, http://www.hamiltonproject.org/assets/legacy/files/downloads_and_links/An_Economic_Strategy_to_Advance_Opportunity_Prosperity_and_Growth.pdf .

4 . For a dissection of video footage of Obama’s performance, see https://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/04/obama-at-the-hamilton-project-2006-this-is-not-a-bloodless-process.html .

5 . Orszag, “Restoring America’s Promise.”

6 . Joint Committee on Taxation Estimated Budget Effects of the Conference Agreement for H.R. 1836, May 26, 2001, JCX-51-01.

7 . P. Blustein, “Reagan’s Record,” Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1985.

8 . S. M. Kosiak, Cost of the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and Other Military Operations Through 2008 and Beyond, CSBA, December 15, 2008; and J. Stiglitz and L. Bilmes, The Three Trillion Dollar War (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008).

9 . T. Oatley, A Political Economy of American Hegemony: Buildups, Booms, and Busts (New York: CUP, 2015).

10 . Data from https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/budget-economic-data#2 .

11 . A. Sinai, P. Orszag and R. Rubin, “Sustained Budget Deficits: Longer-Run US Economic Performance and the Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray,” Brookings Institution, January 5, 2004.

12 . See the highly influential account by B. Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

13 . D. Wessel and T. T. Vogel Jr., “Arcane World of Bonds Is Guide and Beacon to a Populist President,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 1993, A1.

14 . “The Long-Term Budget Outlook,” CBO, Washington, DC, 2005, 26. For a Republican view see L. Ball and N. G. Mankiw, “What Do Budget Deficits Do?,” NBER Working Paper 5263, September 1995.

15 . An essential claim common to P. Anderson, American Foreign Policy and Its Thinkers (London: Verso, 2015); and A. Negri and M. Hardt, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).

16 . The phrase is Robert Zoellick’s, then deputy secretary of state, as found in R. Zoellick, “Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility,” New York, September 21, 2005 (New York: NCUSCR, 2005), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm .

17 . M. J. Dunne, American Wheels, Chinese Roads: The Story of General Motors in China (Singapore: Wiley, 2011).

18 . Z. Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

19 . M. Mandelbaum, Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post–Cold War Era (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

20 . Linking his distinctive approach to the hierarchical nature of money, shadow banking and the “money view” see the presentation by Perry Mehrling, “Shadow Banking, Central Banking, and the Future of Global Finance,” City University London, February 2, 2013, https://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/163440/Mehrling_Future-Global-Finance-126sn0t.pdf .

21 . E. Ilzetkzi, C. M. Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff, “Exchange Arrangements Entering the 21st Century: Which Anchor Will Hold?,” (NBER Working Paper 23134, 2017).

22 . M. Pettis, The Volatility Machine: Emerging Economies and the Threat of Financial Collapse (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

23 . Time (cover), February 1999; and Rubin and Weisberg, In an Uncertain World .

24 . G. A. Calvo, “Sudden Stop, Financial Factors and Economic Collapse in Latin America” (NBER Working Paper 11153, 2005).

25 . “The Argentine Crisis, 2001–2002,” Rabobank, August 23, 2013, https://economics.rabobank.com/publications/2013/august/the-argentine-crisis-20012002-/ .

26 . M. Wolf, Fixing Global Finance (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).

27 . M. P. Dooley, D. Folkerts Landau and P. Garber, “The Revived Bretton Woods System,” International Journal of Finance & Economics 9 (2004), 307–313.

28 . D. A. Steinberg, “Why Has China Accumulated Such Large Foreign Reserves?,” in The Great Wall of Money: Power and Politics in China’s International Monetary Relations, ed. E. Helleiner and J. Kirshner (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 71.

29 . E. M. Truman, “Sovereign Wealth Funds: The Need for Greater Transparency and Accountability,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2007, https://piie.com/publications/pb/pb07-6.pdf .

30 . P. G. Peterson, “Riding for a Fall,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2004), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2004-09-01/riding-fall .

31 . N. Roubini, “The US as a Net Debtor: The Sustainability of the US External Imbalances,” November 2004, http://people.stern.nyu.edu/nroubini/papers/Roubini-Setser-US-External-Imbalances.pdf .

32 . S. Edwards, “Is the US Current Account Deficit Sustainable? And If Not, How Costly Is Adjustment Likely to Be?” (NBER Working Paper 11541, August 2005).

33 . N. Ferguson and M. Schularick, “‘Chimerica’ and the Global Asset Market Boom,” International Finance 10 (2007), 215–239, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-2362.2007.00210.x/abstract .

34 . Ferguson and Schularick, “‘Chimerica.’”

35 . L. H. Summers, “The United States and the Global Adjustment Process” (speech, Stavros S. Niarchos Lecture Institute, Washington, DC, 2004).

36 . R. Suskind, The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, the White House, and the Education of Paul O’Neill (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 291–292.

37 . B. Delong, “I Belong to No Organized Political Party,” Grasping Reality with Both Hands (blog), November 2006, http://www.bradford-delong.com/2006/11/index.html .

38 . A. Berman, Herding Donkeys: The Fight to Rebuild the Democratic Party and Reshape American Politics (New York: Picador, 2010).

39 . The quotation is from Matthew Yglesias in B. Delong, “I Belong to No Organized Political Party.”

40 . “Brad Delong: The Democrats’ Line in the Sand,” Economist’s View, June 30, 2008, http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2008/06/brad-delong-the.html .

41 . L R. Jacobs and D. King, Fed Power: How Finance Wins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

42 . Minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting, June 29–30, 2004, https://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/minutes/20040630.htm .

43 . The so-called Mundell-Fleming model of open economy macroeconomics originated already in the 1960s, see J. M. Boughton, “On the Origins of the Fleming-Mundell Model” ( IMF Staff Papers 50, 2003), 1–9.

44 . B. Bernanke, “The Global Saving Glut and the US Current Account Deficit,” No. 77, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US), 2005.

45 . B. Bernanke, “On Milton Friedman’s Ninetieth Birthday” (conference to honor Milton Friedman , November 8, 2002).

46 . M. Friedman and A. J. Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867–1960 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 407–414.

47 . Ben S. Bernanke, “Constrained Discretion and Monetary Policy,” remarks before the Money Marketeers of New York (New York: New York University, 2003).

48 . B. Applebaum, “Bernanke, as Professor, Tries to Buff Fed’s Image,” New York Times , March 20, 2012, and B. Bernanke, “The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis Origins and Mission of the Federal Reserve,” Lecture 1, George Washington University School of Business, March 20, 2012.

49 . T. Adams, “The US View on IMF Reform” ( Conference on IMF reform, September 23, 2005), https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/us-view-imf-reform .

50 . P. Blustein, Off Balance: The Travails of Institutions That Govern the Global Financial System (Waterloo, Ontario: CIGI, 2013), 51–66.

51 . “Paulson May Be Bringing Heft to China Currency Drive,” Taipei Times, June 1, 2006.

52 . One powerful advocate for a G2 approach was the influential Fred Bergsten; see “A Partnership of Equals: How Washington Should Respond to China’s Economic Challenge,” Foreign Affairs 87 (July/August, 2008): 57–69.

53 . “Fact Sheet Creation of the US-China Strategic Economic Dialogue,” US Department of the Treasury, September 20, 2006, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp107.aspx . H. M. Paulson Jr., “A Strategic Economic Engagement: Strengthening US-Chinese Ties,” Foreign Affairs 87 (September/October 2008), 59–77.

54 . For the quotes that follow, see “The Panic About the Dollar,” Economist, November 29, 2007; G. Steingart, “A Pearl Harbor Without War,” Der Spiegel, November 13, 2007; “Supermodel ‘Rejects Dollar Pay,’” BBC News, November 6, 2007; M. Nizza, “Heads Turn over Model’s Disputed Dollar,” New York Times, November 6, 2007; “Gisele Bundchen Doesn’t Want to Be Paid in Dollars,” Fox News, November 5, 2007; C. Giles, “Adjustment or Affliction?,” Financial Times, December 10, 2007; and D. Usborne, “Rappers Join Models in Insisting on Euros as Greenbacks Fall Further Out of Fashion,” Independent, November 17, 2007.

55 . P. Krugman, “Will There Be a Dollar Crisis?,” Economic Policy 22 (2007), 436–467.

56 . D. W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International Security 34 (Fall 2009), 7–45.

57 . J. B. DeLong, “The Wrong Financial Crisis,” Vox, October 10, 2008.

CHAPTER 2: SUBPRIME

1 . Y. Barnes, “Around the World in Dollars and Cents,” Savills World Research, 2016, http://pdf.euro.savills.co.uk/global-research/around-the-world-in-dollars-and-cents-2016.pdf .

2 . Congressional Budget Office, “Housing Wealth and Consumer Spending Report,” 110th Cong., January 2007.

3 . UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2010 , New York, 44.

4 . O. Jordà, M. Schularick and A. M. Taylor, “Betting the House,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, June 2014.

5 . O. Jordà, M. Schularick and A. M. Taylor, “The Great Mortgaging: Housing Finance, Crises and Business Cycles,” Economic Policy 31 (September 2014), 107–152.

6 . W. L. Silber, Volcker: The Triumph of Persistence (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), 125–215.

7 . L. Silk, “The Interest Rate Issue,” New York Times, July 21, 1981.

8 . On the politics of this moment, see S. Eich and A. Tooze, “The Great Inflation,” in Vorgeschichte der Gegenwart: Dimensionen des Strukturbruchs nach dem Boom, ed. A. Doering-Manteuffel, L. Raphael and T. Schlemmer (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2015).

9 . Remarks by Governor Ben S. Bernanke, “The Great Moderation,” at the meetings of the Eastern Economic Association, Washington, DC, February 20, 2004. For a review of the literature that Bernanke was drawing on see James H. Stock and Mark W. Watson, “Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 17 (2002), 159–218.

10 . R. K. Green and S. M. Wachter, “The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 19 (2005), 93–114.

11 . Simplifying a more complicated story analyzed in W. H. Starbuck and P. N. Pant, “Trying to Help S&Ls: How Organizations with Good Intentions Jointly Enacted Disaster,” in Organizational Decision Making, ed. Z. Shapira (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 35–60.

12 . T. Curry and L. Shibut, “The Costs of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and Consequences,” FDIC Banking Review, https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2000dec/brv13n2_2.pdf .

13 . Schwartz, Subprime Nation, 96–101.

14 . R. K. Green and A. B. Schnare, “The Rise and Fall of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Lessons Learned and Options for Reform,” No. 8521, USC Lusk Center for Real Estate, 2009.

15 . R. Rothstein, The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America (New York: W. W. Norton, 2017).

16 . J. B. Judis and R. Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority (New York: Macmillan, 2002).

17 . The most influential statement of the case is C. W. Calomiris and S. H. Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014). For a critical review, see M. Konzcal, “Guest Post: A Review of Fragile by Design, ” Roosevelt Institute, November 3, 2017.

18 . D. Jaffee and J. M. Quigley, “The Future of the Government Sponsored Enterprises: The Role for Government in the US Mortgage Market” (NBER Working Paper 17685, Cambridge, MA, 2011).

19 . N. Fligstein and A. Goldstein, “A Long Strange Trip: The State and Mortgage Securitization, 1968–2010,” in The Oxford Handbook of the Sociology of Finance , ed. A. Preda and K. Knorr-Cetina (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 339–356.

20 . The story is well told in M. Lewis , Liar’s Poker (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010); and B. McLean and J. Nocera, All the Devils Are Here: The Hidden History of the Financial Crisis (New York: Penguin, 2010).

21 . K. Dennis, “The Ratings Game,” University of Miami Law Review 63 (2008–2009); and L. J. White, “The Credit-Rating Agencies and the Subprime Debacle,” Critical Review 21 (2009), 2–3, 389–399.

22 . N. Fligstein and A. Goldstein, “The Anatomy of the Mortgage Securitization Crisis,” in Markets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the US Financial Crisis, Part A , ed. M. Lounsbury and P. M. Hirsch (Bingley: Emerald Group, 2010), 29–70.

23 . Jaffee and Quigley, “The Future of the Government Sponsored Enterprises.”

24 . A. B. Ashcraft and T. Schuermann, “Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 318 (March 2008).

25 . A. Goldstein and N. Fligstein, “The Transformation of Mortgage Finance and the Industrial Roots of the Mortgage Meltdown,” Mimeo , 2014.

26 . P. Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance (London: Verso, 1999).

27 . P. Augar, The Greed Merchants: How the Investment Banks Played the Free Market Game (London: Penguin, 2005).

28 . G. Tett, Fool’s Gold : The Inside Story of J.P. Morgan and How Wall St. Greed Corrupted Its Bold Dream and Created Financial Catastrophe (New York: Free Press, 2009).

29 . G. Krippner, Capitalizing on Crisis: The Political Origins of the Rise of Finance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).

30 . Z. Pozsar, “Institutional Cash Pools and the Triffin Dilemma of the US Banking System” ( IMF Working Paper 11/109, August 2011).

31 . P. Gowan, “Crisis in the Heartland,” New Left Review 55 (January/February 2009).

32 . Augar, Greed Merchants, 34.

33 . Tobias T. Adrian and H. S. Shin, “Liquidity and Lleverage,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 19 (2010), 418–437.

34 . D. MacKenzie, An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 211–242.

35 . G. F. Davis and M. S. Mizruchi, “The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the US System of Corporate Governance,” Administrative Science Quarterly 44 (June 1999), 215–239.

36 . The following is based on Goldstein and Fligstein, “The Transformation of Mortgage Finance.”

37 . K. Grind, The Lost Bank: The Story of Washington Mutual—the Biggest Bank Failure in American History (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012).

38 . A. Blundell-Wignall, P. Atkinson and S. H. Lee, “The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues,” OECD Financial Market Trends (2008). As the authors stress, “2004 is critical in thinking about causality.”

39 . W. Poole, “The GSEs: Where Do We Stand?,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review 95 (November/December 2013), 601–611.

40 . An outstanding introduction to the economics of structured finance and the crisis generally is A. Milne, The Fall of the House of Credit: What Went Wrong in Banking and What Can Be Done to Repair the Damage? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

41 . Summarizing the safe assets shortage literature, R. J. Caballero, E. Farhi and P. Gourinchas, “The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 31 (Summer 2017), 29–46.

42 . D. Clement, “Interview with Gary Gorton,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, December 1, 2010.

43 . G. Gorton, “The History and Economics of Safe Assets” (NBER Working Paper 22210, April 2016).

44 . Goldstein and Fligstein, “Transformation”; V. V. Acharya, P. Schnabl and G. Suarez, “Securitization Without Risk Transfer,” Journal of Financial Economics 107 (2013), 515–536; and E. Engelen et al., After the Great Complacence: Financial Crisis and the Politics of Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 61.

45 . Tett, Fool’s Gold , 124–143.

46 . V. V. Acharya, P. Schnabl and G. Suarez, “Securitization Without Risk Transfer.”

47 . T. Adrian and H. S. Shin, “Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Economics,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 398 (revised May 2010).

48 . T. Adrian et al., “Repo and Securities Lending,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 529 (revised February 2013).

49 . G. B. Gorton and A. Metrick, “Who Ran on Repo?” (NBER Working Paper 18455, October 2012).

50 . E. Callan, “Lehman Brothers—Leverage Analysis,” Lehman Brothers, April 7, 2008, https://web.stanford.edu/~jbulow/Lehmandocs/docs/DEBTORS/LBEX-DOCID%201401225.pdf .

51 . S. Olster, “How the Roof Fell In on Countrywide,” Fortune , December 23, 2010.

52 . Ibid.

53 . Engelen et al., After the Great Complacence, 56.

54 . https://web.archive.org/web/20090226105739/http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20081022112154.pdf .

55 . “Ker-ching: The Thorny Issue of Bankers’ Bonuses,” Economist, January 26, 2008.

56 . A. Haughwout et al., “‘Flip This House’: Investor Speculation and the Housing Bubble,” Liberty Street Economics (blog), Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December 5, 2011.

57 . R. G. Rajan, “Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?” (NBER Working Paper 11728, November 2005).

58 . M. D. Knight, “General Discussion: Has Financial Development Made the World Riskier?,” Kansas City Federal Reserve, 2005, https://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2005/pdf/GD5_2005.pdf .

59 . E. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

60 . D. Rosato, “Confessions of a Former Real Estate Bull,” CNN Money, January 6, 2009.

61 . D. Lereah, Why the Real Estate Boom Will Not Bust (New York: Crown, 2005).

62 . L. Kudlow, “The Housing Bears Are Wrong Again,” National Review, June 20, 2005.

63 . Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez, “Securitization Without Risk Transfer.”

64 . E. R. Morrison and J. Riegel, “Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code: Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges,” American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 13 (2005), 641–644.

65 . H. M. Schwartz, Subprime Nation, 180.

66 . “Shorting Home Equity Mezzanine Tranches: A Strategy to Cash In on a Slowing Housing Market,” Deutsche Bank, February 2007, http://www.valuewalk.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2007_Subprime_Shorting-Home-Equity-Mezzanine-Tranches-1.pdf .

67 . M. Nakomoto and D. Wighton, “Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-outs,” Financial Times, July 9, 2007.

CHAPTER 3: TRANSATLANTIC FINANCE

1 . The phrase “Bush’s feral capitalism” comes from Robin Cook, Tony Blair’s former foreign secretary; see R. Cook, “A Strong Europe—Or Bush’s Feral US Capitalism,” Guardian, October 28, 2004.

2 . “Lessons from a Crisis,” Economist, October 2, 2008.

3 . “Le discours de Nicolas Sarkozy à Toulon,” Le Monde, September 25, 2008.

4 . S. Zedda, “Italian Banks’ Paths Through the Crisis,” Scientific Research, March 2016.

5 . B. Setser, “Too Chinese (and Russian) to Fail?,” Follow the Money (blog), Council on Foreign Relations, July 12, 2008; and Schwartz, Subprime Nation, 101–104.

6 . C. Bertaut, L. P. DeMarco, S. Kamin and R. Tryon, “ABS Inflows to the United States and the Global Financial Crisis,” Journal of International Economics 99 (2012), 219–234; and B. Bernanke, C. Bertaut, L. DeMarco and S. Kamin, “International Capital Flows and the Returns to Safe Assets in the United States, 2003–2007” ( International Finance Discussion Papers, 2011).

7 . D. O. Beltran, L. Pounder and C. Thomas, “Foreign Exposure to Asset-Backed Securities of US Origin” ( International Finance Discussion Papers 939, August 2008, table 6, line 6).

8 . Bank of England, Financial Stability Report (October 22, 2007), table 2.14.

9 . M. Lewis, The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine (New York: W. W. Norton, 2010); and United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee of Investigations, “Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: Anatomy of a Financial Collapse,” April 13, 2011.

10 . HSBC, “Fact Sheet,” April 2005, http://www.banking.us.hsbc.com/personal/pdf/fact_sheet_4-05.pdf [inactive].

11 . M. Zaki, UBS, les dessous d’un scandale: Comment l’empire aux trois clés a perdu son pari (Lausanne: Favre Sa, 2008), 121.

12 . “Deutsche Bank to Acquire MortgageIT Holdings, Inc.,” Deutsche Bank, July 12, 2006.

13 . V. Acharya and P. Schnabl, “Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances? The Case of Asset-Backed Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007–09,” Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, November 5–6, 2009.

14 . N. Baba, R. N. McCauley and S. Ramaswamy, “US Dollar Money Market Funds and Non-US Banks,” BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009.

15 . H. S. Shin, “Global Banking Glut and Loan Risk Premium,” Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, November 10–11, 2011.

16 . Bertaut et al., “ABS Inflows to the United States and the Global Financial Crisis.”

17 . T. Norfield, The City: London and the Global Power of Finance (London: Verso, 2017); D. Kynaston, City of London: The History, vol. 4 (London: Penguin, 2002); and N. Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Uncovering the Damage of Offshore Banking and Tax Havens (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2012).

18 . E. Helleiner, States and the Reemergence of Global Finance: From Bretton Woods to the 1990s (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996).

19 . J. Green, “Anglo-American Development, the Euromarkets, and the Deeper Origins of Neoliberal Deregulation,” Review of International Studies 42 (2016), 425–449.

20 . P. Augar, The Death of Gentlemanly Capitalism: The Rise and Fall of London’s Investment Banks (London: Penguin, 2000).

21 . The office was inherited by Lehman from Enron in 2001, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/25_Bank_Street .

22 . “Triennial Central Bank Survey: Report on Global Foreign Exchange Market Activity in 2010,” Monetary and Economic Department, Bank for International Settlements, December 2010, http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf10t.pdf .

23 . L. Jones, “Current Issues Affecting the OTC Derivatives Market and Its Importance to London,” City of London, April 2009, https://www.cityoflondon.gov.uk/business/economic-research-and-information/research-publications/Documents/research%202009/Current%20issues%20affecting%20the%20OTC%20derivatives%20market%20and%20its%20importance%20to%20London.pdf .

24 . G. Morgan, “Supporting the City: Economic Patriotism in Financial Markets,” Journal of European Public Policy 19 (2012), 373–387.

25 . R. Wade, “Financial Regime Change?,” New Left Review 53 (September/October 2008).

26 . “Financial Regulation: Industry Changes Prompt Need to Reconsider US Regulatory Structure,” US Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-61, October 6, 2004.

27 . A. Baker, “Restraining Regulatory Capture? Angloamerica, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance,” International Affairs 86 (2010), 647–663.

28 . Wade, “Financial Regime Change?”

29 . M. Singh and J. Aitken, “The (Sizable) Role of Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System” (IMF Working Paper WP/10/172, July 2010).

30 . Green, “Anglo-American Development.”

31 . M. Hirsch, Capital Offense: How Washington’s Wise Men Turned America’s Future Over to Wall Street (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 200.

32 . Zaki, UBS, 75.

33 . L. S. Talani, “The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on the City of London: Towards the End of Hegemony?,” Competition and Change 15 (February 2011), 11–30.

34 . D. K. Tarullo, “Regulating Large Foreign Banking Organizations,” Harvard Law School Symposium on Building the Financial System of the Twenty-first Century: An Agenda for Europe and the United States, March 27, 2014.

35 . “Rating Action: Moody’s Downgrades Depfa Entities to A2, BFSR at D+,” Moody’s Investors Service, September 30, 2008.

36 . G. Robinson, “Hypo to Buy Depfa Bank for €5.7bn,” Financial Times, July 23, 2007.

37 . W. Munchau, The Meltdown Years (Munich: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 19–28.

38 . D. K. Tarullo, “Banking on Basel,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2008.

39 . R. Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 88.

40 . Abdelal, Capital Rules , 193–194.

41 . A. Blundell-Wignall, P. Atkinson and S. H. Lee, “The Current Financial Crisis: Causes and Policy Issues,”’ OECD Financial Markets Trends (2008).

42 . A. Blundell-Wignall and P. Atkinson, “The Subprime Crisis: Causal Distortions and Regulatory Reform” (2008), in P. Bloxham and C. Kent, Lessons from the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008, proceedings of a conference, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney.

43 . “The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit Strategy,” 111th Cong., US Government Printing Office, June 10, 2010; and R. Peston, “How Banks Depend on AIG,” BBC News, September 16, 2008.

44 . “The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets,” 111th Cong.

45 . A. Baker, “Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance,” International Affairs 86 (2010), 647–663.

46 . M. Thiemann, “In the Shadow of Basel: How Competitive Politics Bred the Crisis,” Review of International Political Economy (February 5, 2014), 1203–1239.

47 . M. Berlin, “New Rules for Foreign Banks: What’s at Stake?,” Business Review, Federal Reserve of Philadelphia, 2015; and “Letter SR 01-1: Application of the Board’s Capital Adequacy Guidelines to Bank Holding Companies Owned by Foreign Banking Organizations,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, January 5, 2001, https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2001/sr0101.htm .

48 . S. Bair (speech, Risk Management and Allocation Conference, July 25, 2007).

49 . S. Bair, Bull by the Horns: Fighting to Save Main Street from Wall Street and Wall Street from Itself (New York: Free Press, 2012), 38–39.

50 . S. G. Cecchetti, “Five Years in the Tower” (speech, BIS Annual Conference, 2013). In 2008 Deutsche’s leverage would soar to 70:1. On UBS, see Zaki, UBS, 117.

51 . C. Hughes and J. Grant, “City Limits: London Counts the Cost of Six Stormy Months for Banks,” Financial Times, January 20, 2008.

52 . J. R. Dearie and G. J. Vojta, “Reform and Modernization of Financial Supervision in the United States: A Competitive and Prudential Imperative,” Mimeo , 2007.

53 . A. Appadurai, Banking on Words: The Failure of Language in the Age of Derivative Finance (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

54 . P. Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Crisis That Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003).

55 . Roche, Histoire secrete d’un krach qui dure , 99–100; and P. Blustein, Off Balance, 113–114.

56 . M. Obstfeld, J. C. Shambaugh and A. M. Taylor, “Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008” (NBER Working Paper 14826, 2009).

57 . P. McGuire and G. von Peter, “The US Dollar Shortage in Global Banking,” BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009.

58 . For a review of the arguments see J. Aizenman and L. Jaewoo, “Financial Versus Monetary Mercantilism: Long-Run View of Large International Reserves Hoarding,” World Economy 31 (2008), 593–611.

CHAPTER 4: EUROZONE

1 . The most authoritative history is H. James, Making the European Monetary Union (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012); a useful economist’s introduction is J. Pisani-Ferry, The Euro Crisis and Its Aftermath (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). On the politics see D. Marsh, The Euro: Battle for the New Global Currency (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009).

2 . R. Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).

3 . M. E. Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009).

4 . Among many others, T. Mayer, Europe’s Unfinished Currency: The Political Economics of the Euro (New York: Anthem Press, 2012). The author was chief economist at Deutsche Bank from 2009–2012.

5 . A concern expressed early by D. Gros, “Will EMU Survive 2010?,” Center for European Policy Studies, January 17, 2006.

6 . T. Bayoumi and B. Eichengreen, “Shocking Aspects of European Monetary Unification” (NBER Working Paper 3949, 1992).

7 . M. Feldstein, “The Political Economy of the European Economic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (1997), 23–42.

8 . U. G. Silveri, “Italy 1990–2014: The Transition That Never Happened,” Journal of Modern Italian Studies 20 (2015), 171–175.

9 . K. Dyson and K. Featherstone, “Italy and EMU as a ‘Vincolo Esterno’: Empowering the Technocrats, Transforming the State,” South European Society and Politics 1.2 (1996), 272–299.

10 . “The Sick Man of the Euro,” Economist, June 3, 1999.

11 . R. R. G. Heinze, Blockierte Gesellschaft (Opladen: VS Verlag, 1998); and K. v. Hammerstein et al., “Die blockierte Republik,” Der Spiegel, September 21, 2002.

12 . A. Hassel and C. Schiller, Der Fall Hartz IV (Frankfurt: Campus, 2010); and S. Beck and C. Scherrer, “Der rot-grüne Einstieg in den Abschied vom ‘Modell Deutschland’: Ein Erklärungsversuch,” Prokla 35 (2005), 111–130.

13 . S. Dullien, “A German Model for Europe?,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 1, 2013.

14 . M. Fratzscher, Verteilungskampf: Warum Deutschland immer ungleicher wird (Munich: Carl Hanser, 2016); and C. Odendahl, “The Hartz Myth: A Closer Look at Germany’s Labour Market Reforms,” Center for European Reform, June 2017.

15 . H. Geiling, ed., Die Krise der SPD: autoritäre oder partizipatorische Demokratie (Münster: LIT, 2010).

16 . A. Crawford, Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis (Sussex: Bloomberg Press, 2013); and M. Qvortrup, Angela Merkel: Europe’s Most Influential Leader (New York: Overlook Press, 2016).

17 . “The Merkel Plan,” Economist, June 15, 2013.

18 . Rede von Bundeskanzlerin, “Dr. Angela Merkel beim Weltwirtschaftsforum am,” January 25, 2006 in Davos, https://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/DE/Bulletin/2001_2007/2006/01/07-1-Merkel.html .

19 . C. Egle and R. Zohlnhöfer, eds., Die zweite Große Koalition: eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2005–2009 (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010).

20 . Peer Steinbrück, Unterm strich (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2010).

21 . A term launched by Colin Crouch in 2000 that acquired far more traction in Germany than in the Anglosphere. C. Crouch, “Coping with Post-Democracy,” Fabian Ideas , no. 598 (2000); C. Crouch, Post-Democracy (Cambridge: Polity, 2004); and “Postdemokratie?,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, February 1, 2011.

22 . S. Lessenich, “Die Kosten der Einheit,” Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, March 30, 2010.

23 . “Steinbrück setzt auf schwarze Null,” Der Tagesspiegel , July 4, 2007.

24 . W. Wolfrum, Rot-Grün an der Macht: Deutschland 1998–2005 (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2013).

25 . For an insightful but uncritical portrait, see N. Irwin, The Alchemists: Three Central Bankers and a World on Fire (New York: Penguin, 2013).

26 . C. Ban, Ruling Ideas: How Global Neoliberalism Goes Local (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

27 . D. Gabor and C. Ban, “Banking on Bonds: The New Links Between States and Markets,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54 (2015), 617–635.

28 . S. Cheun, I. von Köppen-Mertes, and B. Weller, “The Collateral Frameworks of the Eurosystem, the Federal Reserve System and the Bank of England and the Financial Market Turmoil,” Occasional Paper No. 107, European Central Bank, 2009; and D. Gabor, “The Power of Collateral: The ECB and Bank Funding Strategies in Crisis,” (May 18, 2012), available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2062315 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2062315 .

29 . W. Buiter and A. Sibert, “How the Eurosystem’s Treatment of Collateral in Its Open Market Operations Weakens Fiscal Discipline in the Eurozone (and What to Do About It),” CEPR Discussion Papers No. 5387, 2005; and the discussion in Schelkle, Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity , 145–148.

30 . For two instances, Bernanke, Courage to Act, 477; and M. Lewis on Greece, the Eurozone and the implicit German guarantee, “How the Financial Crisis Created a ‘New Third World,’” NPR Fresh Air, September 30, 2011, http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=140948138 .

31 . S. Storm and C. W. Naastepad, “Myths, Mix-ups and Mishandlings: What Caused the Eurozone Crisis?,” Institute for New Economic Thinking Annual Conference, April 11, 2015, table 2.

32 . P. Lourtie, “Understanding Portugal in the Context of the Euro Crisis,” in Resolving the European Debt Crisis, ed. W. R. Cline and G. Wolff (Washington, DC: PIIE, 2012).

33 . C. Wyplosz and S. Sgherri, “The IMF’s Role in Greece in the Context of the 2010 Stand-By Arrangement,” Independent Evaluation Office of the IMF, BP/16-02/11, 2016.

34 . S. Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and M. Husson, “The Greek Public Debt Before the Crisis,” March 2015, http://hussonet.free.fr/graudite.pdf .

35 . Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan, 24.

36 . P. R. Lane, “Capital Flows in the Euro Area,” Economic Papers 497 (April 2013).

37 . G. Gorton and A. Metrick, “Securitization” (2011), in Handbook of the Economics of Finance , ed. G. Constantinides, M. Harris and R. Stulz (North Holland: Elsevier, 2012); and T. Santos, “Antes del Diluvio: The Spanish Banking System in the First Decade of the Euro,” in After the Flood: How the Great Recession Changed Economic Thought , Edward L. Glaeser, Tano Santos and Glenn Weyl, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017).

38 . Schelkle, Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity , 180–185.

39 . Storm and Naastepad, “Myths, Mix-ups and Mishandlings.”

40 . P. R. Lane, “The Funding of the Irish Domestic Banking System During the Boom,” Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland 44 (2014), 40–71.

41 . S. Royo, “How Did the Spanish Financial System Survive the First Stage of the Global Crisis?,” Governance 26 (October 2013), 631–656; Santos, “Antes del Diluvio.”

42 . A. Cárdenas, “The Spanish Savings Bank Crisis: History, Causes and Responses” (Working Paper 13-003, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, 2013); and Santos, “Antes del Diluvio.”

43 . T. Santos, “El Diluvio: The Spanish Banking Crisis, 2008–2012,” manuscript, Columbia Business School, Columbia University (2017).

44 . Santos, “Antes del Diluvio.”

45 . I. Jack, “Ireland: The Rise and the Crash,” New York Review of Books, November 11, 2010, reviewing F. O’Toole, Ship of Fools: How Stupidity and Corruption Sank the Celtic Tiger (London: Faber and Faber, 2009).

46 . P. De Grauwe, “How to Embed the Eurozone in a Political Union,” Vox, June 17, 2010. For a devastating review of the blindspots of conventional theories of optimum currency area and their insistence on fiscal integration see Schelkle, Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity , 174–179. For a review of discussions about financial stabilization following the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 see M. Obstfeld, “Finance at Center Stage: Some Lessons of the Euro Crisis,” Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs No. 493 (DG ECFIN), European Commission, 2013.

47 . For an alarmingly bland summary of the EU’s precautionary arrangements see ECB, “The EU Arrangements for Financial Crisis Management,” ECB Monthly Bulletin , February 2007. One of the first to highlight the size of the potential problem from the onset of the crisis was N. Veron, “Is Europe Ready for a Major Banking Crisis?,” Bruegel Policy Brief (August 9, 2007).

48 . D. K. Tarullo, “Regulating Large Foreign Banking Organizations” (speech, Harvard Law School Symposium on Building the Financial System of the Twenty-first Century: An Agenda for Europe and the United States, March 27, 2014).

49 . A. Milward, European Rescue of the Nation State (London: Routledge, 1992).

50 . L. H. Summers, “Summers Speaks,” Magazine of International Economic Policy ( Fall 2007), http://www.international-economy.com/TIE_F07_Summers.pdf .

51 . G. Majone, Europe as the Would-Be World Power (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

52 . M. Bernard, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing: Les ambitions déçues (Paris: Armand-Colin, 2014).

53 . M. O’Neill, The Struggle for the European Constitution: A Past and Future History (Basingstoke, UK: Routledge, 2009).

54 . M. K. Davis Cross, The Politics of Crisis in Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

55 . S. Kornelius, Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World (London: Alma Books, 2014).

56 . For an excellent discussion, see H. Kundnani, The Paradox of German Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

57 . S. Fabbrini, Which European Union? Europe After the Euro Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

58 . R. Kagan, “Americans Are from Mars, Europeans Are from Venus,” Sunday Times, February 2, 2003, which gave rise to the following book: R. Kagan, Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (London: Vintage, 2003).

59 . Habermas and Derrida, “February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together.”

60 . In deep agreement with the basic diagnosis common to P. Anderson, The New Old World (London: Verso, 2009); and P. Baldwin, The Narcissism of Minor Differences: How America and Europe Are Alike (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

61 . J. Herf, War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles (New York: Free Press, 1991); and L. Nuti, F. Bozo, M. Rey and B. Rother, eds., The Euromissile Crisis and the End of the Cold War (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2015).

CHAPTER 5: MULTIPOLAR WORLD

1 . M. E. Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).

2 . G. Soros, “Not Without US Aid,” Wall Street Journal , December 7, 1989.

3 . M. G. Gilman, No Precedent, No Plan: Inside Russia’s 1998 Default (Boston: MIT Press, 2010).

4 . P. Blustein, The Chastening: Inside the Crisis That Rocked the Global Financial System and Humbled the IMF (New York: PublicAffairs, 2003), 235–277.

5 . J. Johnson, “Forbidden Fruit: Russia’s Uneasy Relationship with the US Dollar,” Review of International Political Economy 15 (2008), 379–398.

6 . P. Ther, Europe Since 1989: A History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).

7 . J. M. Goldgeier, Not Whether but When: The US Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1999).

8 . S. F. Szabo, Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2004).

9 . “Outrage at ‘Old Europe’ Remarks,” BBC News, January 23, 2003.

10 . R. Prodi, “Europe and Peace” (speech, University of Ulster, April 1, 2004).

11 . J. Becker, “Europe’s Other Periphery,” New Left Review 99 (May/June 2016).

12 . R. Martin, Constructing Capitalisms: Transforming Business Systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

13 . J. Hardy, Poland’s New Capitalism (London: Pluto Press, 2009).

14 . M. Ferry and I. McMaster, “Cohesion Policy and the Evolution of Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe,” Europe-Asia Studies 65 (2013), 1502–1528.

15 . K. Wolczuk, “Integration Without Europeanisation: Ukraine and Its Policy Towards the European Union” (EUI working paper 15, Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies, 2004).

16 . A. Polese, “Ukraine 2004: Informal Networks, Transformation of Social Capital and Coloured Revolutions,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 25 (2009), 255–277.

17 . “Doing Business 2006,” World Bank (September 13, 2005), http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2006 .

18 . “Classification of Exchange Rate Arrangements and Monetary Policy Frameworks,” IMF, June 30, 2004.

19 . For an outstanding treatment of the Romanian case, see D. Gabor, Central Banking and Financialization: A Romanian Account of How Eastern Europe Became Subprime (Basingstoke, UK: Routledge, 2010).

20 . J. Johnson, Priests of Prosperity: How Central Bankers Transformed the Postcommunist World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016).

21 . Blustein, Off Balance, 1–12.

22 . “Simulating Financial Instability,” Conference on Stress Testing and Financial Crisis Simulation Exercises, European Central Bank, July 12–13, 2007, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/simulatingfinancialinstability200809en.pdf?f6427026bcf400e849ff88415b1386ba .

23 . Blustein, Off Balance, 67–92.

24 . “Minister Rinkēvičs: The Foreign Ministry Building Is a Touchstone for the Nation’s History,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, November 15, 2013.

25 . T. Rostoks, “Latvia’s Foreign Policy—Living Through Hard Times,” Diplomaatia (blog) (April 2010), https://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/latvias-foreign-policy-living-through-hard-times/ .

26 . R. Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and R. Sakwa, Putin and the Oligarchs: The Khodorkovsky-Yukos Affair (London: I. B. Tauris, 2014).

27 . P. Hanson, “The Economic Development of Russia: Between State Control and Liberalization” (ISPI Working Paper 32, October 2008).

28 . Johnson, “Forbidden Fruit.”

29 . F. Hill and C. G. Gaddy, Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2013), chapter 5.

30 . P. Anderson, “Incommensurate Russia,” New Left Review 94 (July–August 2015).

31 . World Bank in Russia, Russia Economic Report 17 (November 2008), table 1.9.

32 . A. E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014); and Hill and Gaddy, Mr. Putin.

33 . P. Gallis, NATO and Energy Security, CRS Report for Congress (August 15, 2007).

34 . “Kudrin Has Reservations on Dollar,” Moscow Times, April 24, 2006.

35 . Johnson, “Forbidden Fruit.”

36 . The text of Putin’s speech is at “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” Washington Post, February 12, 2007.

37 . “At $US250 a Barrel, We’re Headed for Meltdown,” Sydney Morning Herald, June 21, 2008.

38 . A. E. Kramer, “As Gazprom Goes, So Goes Russia,” New York Times, May 11, 2008.

39 . “Putin’s Prepared Remarks.”

40 . D. Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West,” Foreign Affairs 85 (July/August 2006), 87.

41 . “Gates Dismisses Putin Remarks as Blunt Spy Talk,” Reuters, February 12, 2007.

42 . “Migration in Europe: Case Studies: Bulgaria and Romania,” CRCE 2010 Colloquium, 2010.

43 . “Country report: Lugoj, Romania,” Ungersteel, http://www.ungersteel.com/unger/download/UngerSteelGroup_Lugoj-property_Exposee.pdf .

44 . Europe Real Estate Yearbook (The Hague: Europe Real Estate Publishers, 2008), 362.

45 . “ING Real Estate Buys in Germany and Romania,” PropertyEU (October 9, 2007).

46 . G. Toal, Near Abroad: Putin, the West and the Contest over Ukraine and the Caucasus (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

47 . “The President’s News Conference with President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine in Kiev, Ukraine,” The American Presidency Project (April 1, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=76910 .

48 . S. Erlanger and S. L. Myers, “NATO Allies Oppose Bush on Georgia and Ukraine,” New York Times, April 3, 2008.

49 . Ibid.

50 . C. Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Broadway Books, 2011), 422.

51 . J. Mearsheimer, “How the West Caused the Ukraine Crisis,” Foreign Affairs (August 2014).

52 . R. Youngs, Europe’s Eastern Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 50–64.

53 . R. Peston, “Russia ‘Planned Wall Street Bear Raid,’” BBC News, March 17, 2014.

54 . T. Vorobyova, “Russia Will Not Dump Fannie, Freddie Debt: FinMin,” Reuters, August 20, 2008.

55 . Peston, “Russia ‘Planned Wall Street Bear Raid.’”

56 . For this train of events, see the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia Report (September 2009).

57 . Varvara, “President Medvedev: Events in South Ossieta Show That Russia Is a Force to Be Reckoned With,” Voices from Russia (September 6, 2008), https://02varvara.wordpress.com/2008/09/06/president-medvedev-events-in-south-ossetia-show-that-russia-is-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with/ .

58 . “Georgian War Exposes Rift with Russians,” Deutsche Welle , August 15, 2008.

59 . A. Rahr, Putin nach Putin (Munich: Universitas-Verlag, 2008), 269.

60 . “Press Conference by President of France Nicolas Sarkozy” (United Nations press conference, September 23, 2008), http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/080923_Sarkozy.doc.htm .

CHAPTER 6: “THE WORST FINANCIAL CRISIS IN GLOBAL HISTORY”

1 . The mechanism described brilliantly for the United States by A. Mian and A. Sufi, House of Debt: How They (and You) Caused the Great Recession, and How We Can Prevent It from Happening Again (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), applies generally.

2 . For a narrative of the main bank failures, see Milne, Fall of the House of Credit, 195–256.

3 . DealBook, “UBS’s Hedge Fund: A Post-Mortem,” New York Times, June 4, 2007.

4 . T. Buck, “National Reputation Hangs on IKB Rescue,” Financial Times, August 2, 2007.

5 . Roche, Histoire Secrète .

6 . “BNP Paribas Suspends Funds Because of Subprime Problems,” New York Times, August 9, 2007.

7 . Munchau, The Meltdown Years, 102.

8 . Irwin, The Alchemists, 2.

9 . L. Elliott, “Credit Crisis—How It All Began,” Guardian, August 4, 2008.

10 . H. S. Scott, Connectedness and Contagion: Protecting the Financial System from Panics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2016).

11 . H. S. Shin, “Reflections on Northern Rock: The Bank Run That Heralded the Global Financial Crisis,” Jounal of Economic Perspectives 23 (2009), 101–119.

12 . “Lessons of the Fall,” Economist, October 18, 2007.

13 . United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011), 283.

14 . The significance of runs in triparty repo, bilateral repo and ABCP markets is debated between G. Gorton and A. Metrick, “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo,” Journal of Financial Economics 104, no. 3 (2012), 425–451; G. B. Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 39–40; and A. Krishnamurthy, S. Nagel and D. Orlov, “Sizing Up Repo,” Journal of Finance 69, no. 6 (December 2014), 2381–2417.

15 . G. B. Gorton and A. Metrick, “Who Ran on Repo?” (NBER Working Paper 18455, 2012); T. Adrian and H. Y. Shin, “The Shadow Banking System: Implications for Financial Regulation,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 382 (July 1, 2009).

16 . Gordon and Metrick, “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo.”

17 . L. Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers: Introduction and Summary” ( NBER Working Paper 22410, 2016).

18 . “Liquidity Management at Lehman Brothers,” Lehman Brothers, July 2008.

19 . A. Copeland, A. Martin and M. Walker, “Repo Runs: Evidence from the Tri-Party Repo Market,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 506 (July 2011).

20 . T. V. Dang, G. Gorton and B. Holmstrom, “Haircuts and Repo Chains,” Working Paper, October 17, 2013.

21 . Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers,” 37.

22 . The authoritative account of the AIG disaster is Congressional Oversight Panel , “ The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on Markets, and the Government’s Exit Strategy,” June Oversight Report (June 10, 2010).

23 . G. Morgenson and L. Story, “Testy Conflict with Goldman Helped Push A.I.G. to Edge,” New York Times, February 6, 2010.

24 . Ibid.; https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0701-Goldman-AIG-Collateral-Call-timeline.pdf .

25 . P. E. McCabe, “The Cross Section of Money Market Fund Risks and Financial Crises” (FEDS Working Paper 2010-51, September 12, 2010).

26 . M. T. Kacperczyk and P. Schnabl, “How Safe Are Money Market Funds?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 128 (2013), 1073–1122.

27 . Board of Trustees of the Primary Fund-In Liquidation, “Additional Information Regarding Primary Fund-In Liquidation,” September 23, 2014.

28 . Gorton and Metrick, “Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo.”

29 . Goldman’s self-justificatory official narrative hastens to add that this was an artifact of self-imposed new accounting rules. The next day the pool rebounded to $89 billion, but even this was 20 percent down on the level only days earlier. http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/in-the-news/archive/response-to-fcic-folder/gs-liquidity.pdf .

30 . P. Krugman, End This Depression Now! (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012), 115.

31 . V. Ivashina and E. Scharfstein, “Bank Lending During the Financial Crisis of 2008,” Journal of Financial Economics 97 (2010), 319–338.

32 . P. McGuire and G. von Peter, “The US Dollar Shortage in Global Banking and the International Policy Response” (BIS Working Paper 291, October 2009).

33 . Transcript of the FMOC meeting, September 16, 2008.

34 . A. R. Sorkin, Too Big to Fail: The Inside Story of How Wall Street and Washington Fought to Save the Financial System—and Themselves (New York: Penguin, 2010), 1–2.

35 . https://www.juliusbaer.com/files/user_upload/your-private-bank/investment-excellence/research/european-wealth-report/documents/Wealth_Report_Europe.pdf .

36 . ING Economic and Financial Analysis, “Household Wealth in Europe: Post-Crisis Recovery Leaves Big Differences Between Countries and Households,” January 18, 2016.

37 . R. Lydon and T. McIndoe-Calder, “The Great Irish (De)Leveraging 2005–14,” Irish Economic Analysis Division Central Bank of Ireland, March 2017.

38 . P. K. Brooks, “IMF Survey: Households Hit Hard by Wealth Losses,” World Economic Outlook : IMF Research Department, June 24, 2009.

39 . US Department of Treasury, “The Financial Crisis Response: In Charts,” April 2012.

40 . “The Cost of the Crisis: $20 Trillion and Counting,” Better Markets, July 2015.

41 . A. Bangalore, “US Housing Market: Share of Underwater Homes Trending Down,” Market Oracle, July 13, 2012, http://www.marketoracle.co.uk/Article35579.html .

42 . E. Wolff, “The Asset Price Meltdown and the Wealth of the Middle Class,” US2010: Discover America in a New Century , May 2013.

43 . State of Working America, “African Americans,” Economic Policy Institute (ND), http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/fact-sheets/african-americans./

44 . D. G. Bocian, W. Li and K. Ernst, “Foreclosures by Race and Ethnicity: The Demographics of a Crisis,” Center for Responsible Lending Research, June 18, 2010.

45 . M. Hall, K. Crowder and A. Spring, “Neighborhood Foreclosures, Racial/Ethnic Transitions, and Residential Segregation,” American Sociological Review 80.3 (2015), 526–549.

46 . Mian and Sufi, House of Debt , 38.

47 . Brooks, “IMF Survey.”

48 . “The Bankruptcy of General Motors: A Giant Falls,” Economist, June 4, 2009.

49 . K. Hill, D. Menk, J. Cregger and M. Schultz , Contribution of the Automotive Industry to the Economies of All Fifty States and the United States (Ann Arbor, MI: Center for Automotive Research, 2015).

50 . “The Crisis in the Car Industry: No Opel, No Hope,” Economist, March 5, 2009.

51 . B. Deilus, “Economic Performance of Mexico and South Korea After 2008 Crisis” (2015), http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/v_2015_10_23_desilus.pdf ; M. A. Villarreal, The Mexican Economy After the Global Financial Crisis, Congressional Research Service, September 16, 2010.

52 . J. Sidaoui, M. Ramos-Francia and G. Cuadra, “The Global Financial Crisis and Policy Response in Mexico,” ( BIS Papers 54, 2010).

53 . “75 Years of Toyota,” http://www.toyota-global.com/company/history_of_toyota/75years/index.html .

54 . M. Fackler, “Toyota Expects Its First Loss in 70 Years,” New York Times, December 22, 2008.

55 . M. Sommer, “Why Has Japan Been Hit So Hard by the Global Recession?,” IMF Staff Position Note, March 18, 2009.

56 . K. Otsuka, “Resurgent Hitachi Goes Global After Painful Reforms,” Japan Times, May 28, 2015.

57 . “Japan’s Electronics Giants: Unplugged,” Economist, February 5, 2009.

58 . R. Baldwin, ed., The Great Trade Collapse: Causes, Consequences and Prospects (VoxEU, 2009), 58, http://voxeu.org/content/great-trade-collapse-causes-consequences-and-prospects .

59 . K. Hopkins, “German Economy Suffered Worst Postwar Slump in 2009,” Guardian, January 13, 2010.

60 . H. Comert and S. Colak, “The Impacts of the Global Crisis on the Turkish Economy and Policy Responses,” Economic Research Center, December 2014.

61 . M. Yalçin, “Evaluation of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis’ Effects on Turkish Economy: Is It Tangential?,” May 15, 2012, https://www.academia.edu/1564330/Effect_of_2008_Global_Financial_Crisis_over_Turkey .

62 . Baldwin, Great Trade Collapse .

63 . H. Hakimian and N. Dhillon, “Global Economic Crisis: A Catalyst for Change in Saudi Arabia?,” Brookings Institution, February 25, 2009.

64 . R. Wigglesworth, “Gulf Bank Chief Quits as Kuwait Crisis Deepens,” Financial Times, October 28, 2008.

65 . A. Hanieh, Capitalism and Class in the Gulf Arab States (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

66 . P. Lewis, “Dubai’s Six-Year Building Boom Grinds to Halt as Financial Crisis Takes Hold,” Guardian, February 13, 2009.

67 . International Labour Office, “Global Employment Trends 2011: The Challenge of a Jobs Recovery.”

68 . Clark, Hard Times, 41–67.

69 . International Labour Office, “Global Employment Trends 2011.”

70 . M. Holder, “Unemployment in New York City During the Recession and Early Recovery: Young Black Men Hit the Hardest,” Community Service Society, December 2010.

71 . F. Cai and K. W. Chan, “The Global Economic Crisis and Unemployment in China,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 50, no. 5 (2009), 513–531. For a contrasting effort to estimate global unemployment see International Labour Office, “Global Employment Trends 2011” (Geneva: ILO, 2011).

72 . P. Krugman, “The Great Recession Versus the Great Depression,” New York Times, March 20, 2009.

73 . B. Eichengreen and K. O’Rourke, “Tale of Two Depressions: What Do the New Data Tell Us?,” CEPR, March 8, 2010.

74 . Sorkin, Too Big to Fail, 417.

75 . M. Taibbi, “Secrets and Lies of the Bailout,” Rolling Stone, January 4, 2013.

76 . A. Sorkin, D. Henriques, E. Andrews and J. Nocera, “As Credit Crisis Spiraled, Alarm Led to Action,” New York Times, October 1, 2008.

77 . C. Borio, “Capital Flows and the Current Account: Taking Financing (More) Seriously,” ( BIS Working Paper 525, 2015).

78 . Bernanke, The Courage to Act, 386.

79 . M. Egan, “2008: Worse Than the Great Depression?,” CNN Money, August 27, 2014.

80 . Bernanke, Courage to Act, 386, 561.

81 . Ibid., 561.

82 . Geithner, Stress Test, 200.

83 . “Securitization” rhetorics as strategies of government have been productively analyzed by the so-called Copenhagen school of security studies led by B. Barzun and O. Waeve. For critical reviews see H. Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond,” European Journal of International Relations 13.3 (2007), 357–383; and M. McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security,” European Journal of International Relations 14.4 (2008), 563–587.

84 . Sorkin, Too Big to Fail, 417.

85 . J. Gerth, “Paulson Book: Behind the Scenes, GE’s Top Exec Confided Credit Woes,” ProPublica, February 5, 2010; and B. Condon and N. Vardi, “Harvard: The Inside Story of Its Finance Meltdown,” Forbes, February 26, 2009.

86 . The question put most forcefully by Mian and Sufi, House of Debt.

CHAPTER 7: BAILOUTS

1 . M. Wolf, “The Rescue of Bear Sterns Marks Liberalisation’s Limit,” Financial Times, March 25, 2008.

2 . For contrasting comparisons, see P. Culpepper and R. Raphael, “Structural Power and Bank Bailouts in the United Kingdom and the United States,” Politics and Society 42 (2014), 427–454; C. Woll, The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); and the symposium on financial power in Accounting, Economics and Law 6, no. 1 (2016).

3 . Swiss National Bank, Financial Stability Report (2009); and Zaki, UBS, 184–190.

4 . T. Geithner, “Reflections on the Asian Financial Crises,” Trends in Asian Financial Sectors Conference, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, June 20, 2007.

5 . J. Schildbach, “Bank Performance in the US and Europe: An Ocean Apart,” Deutsche Bank, September 26, 2013.

6 . US Department of the Treasury, “The Financial Crisis Response: In Charts,” April 2012.

7 . On the legitimacy and illegitimacy of adhocracy see P. A. Wallach, To the Edge: Legality, Legitimacy, and the Responses to the 2008 Financial Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2015).

8 . Bernanke, Courage to Act, 432.

9 . F. Norris, “3 Major Banks Offer Plan to Calm Debts in Housing,” New York Times, October 16, 2007.

10 . D. Berman, “A Bailout for Citigroup?,” Deal Journal (blog), Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2007.

11 . A. Barr, “HSBC’s Bailout Puts Pressure on Citi, ‘Superfund,’” MarketWatch, November 26, 2007; D. Wilchin, “HSBC Is Not Interested in SIV Bailout Fund,” Reuters , November 26, 2007; and S. Jones, “SIV Watch: Superfund Not So Super,” Financial Times, December 6, 2007.

12 . I. Fallon, Black Horse Ride: The Inside Story of Lloyds and the Banking Crisis (London: Robson Press, 2015).

13 . A. Nolting, “German Banking Gets Boost from Mega-Merger,” Der Spiegel, September 1, 2008.

14 . K. Kelly, Street Fighters: The Last 72 Hours of Bear Stearns, the Toughest Firm on Wall Street (New York: Portfolio, 2009). For an account from inside Paulson’s Treasury, see P. Swagel, “The Financial Crisis: An Inside View,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring 2009), 1–63.

15 . On the invocation of 13(3), see Wallach, To the Edge , 46–49.

16 . P. Coy, “Volcker Shuns the Blame Game,” Bloomberg Businessweek, April 10, 2008, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2008-04-10/volcker-shuns-the-blame-gamebusinessweek-business-news-stock-market-and-financial-advice .

17 . W. Poole, “Moral Hazard: The Long-Lasting Legacy of Bailouts,” Financial Analysts Journal 65, no. 6 (2009), 17–23; J. H. Cochrane, “Lessons from the Financial Crisis,” Hoover Institution, January 11, 2010; and V. Reinhart, “A Year of Living Dangerously: The Management of the Financial Crisis in 2008,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 25 (2011), 71–90.

18 . W. S. Frame, “The 2008 Federal Intervention to Stabilize Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac” (Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 2009-13, April 2009); and W. S. Frame, A. Fuster, J. Tracy and J. Vickery, “The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 719 (March 2015).

19 . B. Setser, “Too Chinese (and Russian) to Fail?”

20 . T. Ferguson and R. Johnson, “Too Big to Bail: The ‘Paulson Put,’ Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown: Part 1: From Shadow Financial System to Shadow Bailout,” International Journal of Political Economy 38 (2009), 3–34.

21 . Swagel, “The Financial Crisis.”

22 . Paulson, On the Brink, 151.

23 . D. W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International Security 34 (2009), 34.

24 . Peston, “Russia ‘Planned Wall Street Bear Raid.’”

25 . Paulson, On the Brink, 152.

26 . Ibid., 153.

27 . C. Hulse, “Behind a G.O.P. Revolt, Ideology and Politics,” New York Times, July 26, 2008.

28 . G. Farrell, Crash of the Titans: Greed, Hubris, the Fall of Merrill Lynch, and the Near-Collapse of Bank of America (New York: Crown Business, 2010).

29 . Sorkin, Too Big to Fail, 348.

30 . Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers.”

31 . Geithner, Stress Test, 190. The best academic defense of the Paulson-Geithner-Bernanke position is W. Cline and J. Gagnon, “Lehman Died, Bagehot Lives: Why Did the Fed and Treasury Let a Major Wall Street Bank Fail?,” Peterson Institute for International Economics No. PB13-21, 2013.

32 . Bernanke, Courage to Act, 288.

33 . Wall Street Journal staff, “Barney Frank Celebrates Free Market Day,” Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2008.

34 . Swagel, “Financial Crisis,” 41.

35 . Editorial, “Wall Street Casualties,” New York Times, September 15, 2008.

36 . Editorial, “Wall Street Reckoning,” Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2008.

37 . Geithner, Stress Test, 190.

38 . T. Ferguson and R. Johnson, “Too Big to Bail,” 5–45; and Ball, “The Fed and Lehman Brothers.”

39 . A. Darling, Back from the Brink: 1000 Days at Number 11 (London: Atlantic Books, 2011), 121–122.

40 . For this and the following, see Congressional Oversight Panel, “The AIG Rescue, Its Impact on the Markets and the Government’s Exit Strategy.”

41 . Swagel, “The Financial Crisis,” 1–63.

42 . R. Sidel, D. Enrich and D. Fitzpatrick, “WaMu Is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in US Banking History,” Wall Street Journal , September 26, 2008.

43 . “Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan,” New York Times, September 20, 2008.

44 . For the memo, see N. Kashkari and P. Swagel, “‘Break the Glass’ Bank Recapitalization Plan,” US Treasury Department; and Sorkin, Too Big to Fail, chapter 5, http://www.andrewrosssorkin.com/?p=368 .

45 . Swagel, “The Financial Crisis.”

46 . P. Mason, Meltdown: The End of the Age of Greed (London: Verso, 2009), 22.

47 . M. Landler and S. L. Myers, “Buyout Plan for Wall Street Is a Hard Sell on Capitol Hill,” New York Times, September 23, 2008.

48 . C. Isidore, “Bailout Plan Under Fire,” CNN Money, September 23, 2008.

49 . G. Robinson, “Never Underestimate the Power of Populist Scare-Mongering,” Financial Times, September 30, 2008.

50 . “Bernanke, Paulson Face Skeptics on the Hill Despite Dire Warnings,” Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2008.

51 . Cited in Wallach, To the Edge , 85.

52 . W. Buiter, “The Paulson Plan: A Useful First Step but Nowhere Near Enough,” CEPR, September 25, 2008, http://voxeu.org/article/paulson-plan-useful-first-step-nowhere-near-enough .

53 . Mason, Meltdown, 33.

54 . From contrasting political perspectives this is the common refrain of R. Suskind, Confidence Men: Wall Street, Washington, and the Education of a President (New York: HarperPerennial, 2011); C. Gasparino, Bought and Paid For: The Unholy Alliance Between Barack Obama and Wall Street (New York: Portfolio, 2010); and R. Kuttner, A Presidency in Peril (White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2010).

55 . C. Hulse, “Conservatives Viewed Bailout Plan as Last Straw,” New York Times, September 26, 2008.

56 . Paulson, On the Brink, 288; and Bernanke, Courage to Act, 320.

57 . M. Langley, “As Economic Crisis Peaked, Tide Turned Against McCain,” Wall Street Journal, November 5, 2008.

58 . H. M. Paulson, “When Mr. McCain Came to Washington,” Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2010.

59 . C. Hulse and D. Herszenhorn, “Defiant House Rejects Huge Bailout; Next Step Is Uncertain,” New York Times, September 29, 2008.

60 . A. Twin, “Stocks Crushed,” CNN Money, September 29, 2008.

61 . L. Elliot, J. Treanor, P. Wintour and S. Goldenberg, “Bradford & Bingley: Another Day, Another Bail-out,” Guardian, September 28, 2008.

62 . Y. Melin and P. Billiet, “Le scandale Fortis, une histoire belge,” La Revue, January 16, 2009.

63 . C. Schömann-Finc, “Skandalbank HRE: Wie Ackermann Merkel in der Rettungsnacht über den Tisch zog,” Focus Money, September 16, 2013.

64 . F. O’Toole, Ship of Fools: How Stupidity and Corruption Sank the Celtic Tiger (London: Faber & Faber, 2009).

65 . S. Carswell, Anglo Republic: Inside the Bank That Broke Ireland (London: Penguin, 2011).

66 . Darling, Back from the Brink, 143.

67 . Ibid., 144.

68 . Gammelin and Löw, Europas Strippenzieher, 59.

69 . L. Phillips, “France and Germany at Odds over EU ‘Paulson Plan,’” EU Observer, October 2, 2008.

70 . E. Cody and K. Sullivan, “European Leaders Split on Rescue Strategy,” Washington Post, October 3, 2008.

71 . Munchau, Meltdown Years, 136.

72 . DPA, “Banken fordern Hilfe von der EU: Deutsche Banker warnen vor einem europäischen ‘Flickenteppich,’” Zeit Online, October 2, 2008.

73 . D. Gow, “Greece’s Deposit Guarantee Deepens EU Financial Rift,” Guardian, October 2, 2008.

74 . G. Brown, Beyond the Crash (New York: Free Press, 2010), Kindle location 924.

75 . A. Seldon and G. Lodge, Brown at 10 (London: Biteback Publishing, 2011), footnote 148, Kindle locations 5686–5688

76 . C. Bastasin, Saving Europe: Anatomy of a Dream (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2015), 15.

77 . Gammelin and Löw, Europas Strippenzieher .

78 . Deutscher Bundestag 16. Wahlperiode, Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des 2. Untersuchungsausschusses nach Artikel 44 des Grundgesetzes Drucksache 16/14000 (Berlin, 2009).

79 . D. Goffart, Steinbrück—Die Biografie (Munich: Heyne, 2012), 191.

80 . Seldon, Brown at 10, Kindle locations 5706–5710.

81 . Paulson, On the Brink, 332–333.

82 . A. Smith and M. Arnold, “Here Is the Big Reason Banks Are Safer Than a Decade Ago,” Financial Times, August 22, 2017.

83 . R. Perman and A. Darling, Hubris: How HBOS Wrecked the Best Bank in Britain (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2012).

84 . Seldon, Brown at 10, Kindle locations 6856–6861.

85 . FSA, “The Failure of the Royal Bank of Scotland,” Financial Services Board Report (December 2011). The final cash outlays for the RBS rescue of £115 billion (138 billion euros) would make it the largest bailout on record. Schelkle, The Political Economy of Monetary Solidarity , 171.

86 . D. Lin, “Bank Recapitalizations: A Comparative Perspective,” Harvard Journal on Legislation 50 (2013), 513–544.

87 . C. Binham, “Barclays and Former Executives Charged with Crisis-Era Fraud,” Financial Times, June 20, 2017.

88 . P. Krugman, “Gordon Does Good,” New York Times, October 12, 2008.

89 . D. Wessel, In Fed We Trust, Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic (New York: Crown, 2009), 235.

90 . Darling, Back from the Brink , 192 (Kindle edition).

91 . Seldon, Brown at 10, Kindle location 5946.

92 . A. Sutton, K. Lannoo and C. Napoli, Bank State Aid in the Financial Crisis: Fragmentation or Level Playing Field? (Brussels: CEPS, 2010).

93 . G. Brown, Beyond the Crash: Overcoming the First Crisis of Globalization (New York: Free Press, 2010), Kindle locations 1125–1128.

94 . N. Clark and D. Jolly, “French Bank Says Rogue Trader Lost $7 Billion,” New York Times, January 25, 2008.

95 . Summarizing the important conclusions of C. Woll, The Power of Inaction. See also E. Grossman and C. Woll, “Saving the banks: The political economy of bailouts,” Comparative Political Studies 47.4 (2014): 574–600.

96 . On the politics of the German bailouts, see L. Müller, Bank-Räuber: Wie kriminelle Manager und unfähige Politiker uns in den Ruin treiben (Berlin: Econ Verlag, 2010).

97 . T. Braithwaite, K. Scannell and M. Mackenzie, “Deutsche Bank Whistleblower Spurns Share of $16.5m SEC Award,” Financial Times, August 18, 2016.

98 . Spiegel staff, “Germany’s Faltering Bank Bailout Program: The Bottomless Pit—Part II: A Waste of Taxpayers’ Money,” Der Spiegel, December 23, 2008.

99 . Taibbi, “Secrets and Lies of the Bailout .”

100 . Paulson, On the Brink, 333.

101 . Reuters staff, “Paulson Gave Banks No Choice on Government Stakes: Memos,” Reuters, May 13, 2009.

102 . Wessel, In Fed We Trust , 240; and Paulson, On the Brink, 365.

103 . Kuttner, Presidency in Peril, 121.

104 . Gammelin and Löw, Europas Strippenzieher, 57.

105 . In unabashed celebration of Carl Schmitt, see E. Posner and A. Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: After the Madisonian Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For Schmitt on economic emergency see W. E. Scheuerman, “The Economic State of Emergency,” Cardozo Law Review 21 (1999), 1869.

106 . On the difficulty in locating sovereignty even when the exception is declared see J. White, “Emergency Europe,” Political Studies 63.2 (2015), 300–318.

107 . P. Swagel, “The Financial Crisis,” 1–78.

108 . S. M. Davidoff Solomon, “Uncomfortable Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial Crisis,” Minnesota Law Review 95 (2011), 1733–1778.

109 . Even in the UK case, the management of the new, state-owned bank assets was handed off to an unpolitical agency, the UK Financial Investments Ltd, to hold them at arm’s length from the Treasury. P. Burnham, “Depoliticisation: Economic Crisis and Political Management,” Policy & Politics 42.2 (2014), 189–206.

110 . P. Veronesi and L. Zingales, “Paulson’s Gift” (NBER Working Paper 15458, October 2009).

111 . Lin, “Bank Recapitalizations,” 513–544.

112 . Bair, Bull by the Horns, Kindle locations 142–143.

113 . Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, “Extraordinary Financial Assistance Provided to Citigroup, Inc.,” Washington, DC: Office of SIGTARP, January 13, 2011.

114 . B. Bernanke, “Acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America,” Congressional Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, June 25, 2009. BofA did not in the event activate the ring-fence loss protection agreement. Kuttner, Presidency in Peril , 144–146.

115 . D. Dayen, “The Most Important WikiLeaks Revelation Isn’t About Hillary Clinton,” New Republic, October 14, 2016. J. Podesta, “Fw: Huffpost: The Obama Test: Personnel Is Policy,” WikiLeaks, Podesta Emails, October 25, 2008.

116 . C. Rampell, “Christina D. Romer,” New York Times, November 25, 2008.

117 . For a devastating report, see M. Taibbi, “Obama’s Big Sellout: The President Has Packed His Economic Team with Wall Street Insiders,” Common Dreams, December 13, 2009.

CHAPTER 8: “THE BIG THING”: GLOBAL LIQUIDITY

1 . Gillian Tett, “ECB injects €95bn to Help Markets,” Financial Times, August 9, 2007.

2 . Irwin, The Alchemists, 43–73.

3 . McGuire and von Peter. “The US Dollar Shortage.”

4 . N. Baba and F. Packer, “From Turmoil to Crisis: Dislocations in the FX Swap Market Before and After the Failure of Lehman Brothers” ( BIS Working Paper 285, July 2009).

5 . Transcript of the FOMC meeting, September 16, 2008.

6 . W. A. Allen and R. Moessner, “Central Bank Co-operation and International Liquidity in the Financial Crisis of 2008–9” ( BIS Working Paper 310, May 2010).

7 . M. Obstfeld, J. C. Shambaugh and A. M. Taylor, “Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008” (NBER Working Paper No. 14826, January 2009).

8 . R. Marino and U. Volz, “A Critical Review of the IMF’s Tools for Crisis Prevention” (DIE Discussion Paper, April 2012).

9 . Transcript of the FOMC meeting, October 28–29, 2008.

10 . Wessel, In Fed We Trust, 140.

11 . J. L. Broz, “The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007–2010,” International Political Economy Society, University of Virginia, November 9–10, 2012.

12 . T. Adrian and H. S. Shin, “Prices and Quantities in the Monetary Policy Transmission Mechanism,” International Journal of Central Banking 5, no. 4 (2009), 131–142.

13 . L. Randall Wray, “Bernanke’s Obfuscation Continues: The Fed’s $29 Trillion Bail-Out Of Wall Street,” Huffington Post, December 14, 2011.

14 . A useful reference is James Felkerson, “$29,000,000,000,000: A Detailed Look at the Fed’s Bailout by Funding Facility and Recipient,” Levy Economics Institute (Working Paper 698, December 2011).

15 . A. Berger, L. K. Black, C. H. Bouwman and J. Dlugosz, “Bank Loan Supply Responses to Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities,” Journal of Financial Intermediation 32 (October 2017), 1–15.

16 . E. Benmelech, “An Empirical Analysis of the Fed’s Term Auction Facility” (CATO Papers on Public Policy, Working Paper 18304, 2012): 57–91.

17 . T. Adrian, C. R. Burke and J. J. McAndrews, “The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility,” Current Issues in Economics and Finance 15, no. 4 (2009), 1.

18 . M. D. Bordo, O. F. Humpage and A. J. Schwartz, “The Evolution of the Federal Reserve Swap Lines Since 1962,” IMF Economic Review 63, no. 2 (2015), 353–372. On the development of the United States as a global lender of last resort since the 1960s see D. McDowell, Brother Can You Spare a Billion? The United States, the IMF, and the International Lender of Last Resort (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

19 . FOMC meeting, October 28–29, 2008, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20081029meeting.pdf .

20 . Perhaps the first outside commentator to realize their significance was P. Mehrling, “Understanding the Fed’s Swap Line,” Financial Times , November 18, 2008, http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2008/11/254/ . He was followed by M. Obstfeld, J. C. Shambaugh and A. M. Taylor, “Financial Instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008,” American Economic Review 99 (2009): 480–486; D. McDowell, “The US as ‘Sovereign International Last-Resort Lender’: The Fed’s Currency Swap Programme During the Great Panic of 2007–09,” New Political Economy 17.2 (2012), 157–178; J. L. Broz, “The Politics of Rescuing the World’s Financial System: The Federal Reserve as a Global Lender of Last Resort” (November 20, 2014), Korean Journal of International Studies 13 (August 2015), 323–351.

21 . For a recent example, see “US Dollar-British pounds swap agreement,” January 16, 2014, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/markets/USD_Pound_swap_agreement.pdf .

22 . Wessel, In Fed We Trust, 141.

23 . Conference call, FOMC, October 7, 2009, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20081007confcall.pdf .

24 . Conference call, FOMC, December 6, 2007, https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/FOMC20071206confcall.pdf .

25 . Helleiner, Status Quo Crisis, 36.

26 . FOMC meeting, October 28–29, 2008.

27 . The fourteen were the ECB, SNB, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, Bank of Canada, Reserve Bank of Australia, Sveriges Riksbank, Norges Bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, Reserve Bank of New Zealand, Banco Central do Brasil, Banco de Mėxico, Bank of Korea, and Monetary Authority of Singapore. See M. J. Fleming and N. J. Klagge, “The Federal Reserve’s Foreign Exchange Swap Lines,” Current Issues in Economics and Finance 16 no. 4 (2010), 1.

28 . Irwin, The Alchemists, 169.

29 . “No One Telling Who Took $586 Billion in Swaps with Fed Condoning Anonymity,” Bloomberg, December 11, 2011; and “Alan Grayson & Ben Bernanke,” CSPAN, July 21, 2009, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n0NYBTkE1yQ .

30 . FOMC meeting, October 28–29, 2008.

31 . Irwin, The Alchemists, 154.

32 . K. Karlson, “Checks and Balances: Using the Freedom of Information Act to Evaluate the Federal Reserve Banks,” American University Law Review 60 (2010), 213.

33 . J. Anderlini, “China Calls for a New Reserve Currency ,” Financial Times, March 23, 2009; and UN, “Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System,” New York, 2009.

34 . J. Steele, “I’m a Young President, Don’t Try to Label Me,” Guardian, July 2, 2008.

35 . B. Benoit, “Germany Sees an End to US Hegemony,” Financial Times, September 26, 2008.

36 . L. Phillips, “US Laissez-Faire to Battle European ‘Social Market’ at G20,” EUObserver, November 14, 2008, https://euobserver.com/foreign/27114 .

37 . Interview with author.

CHAPTER 9: EUROPE’S FORGOTTEN CRISIS: EASTERN EUROPE

1 . B. Setser, “Where Is My Swap Line? And Will the Diffusion of Financial Power Balkanize the Global Response to a Broadening Crisis?,” October 18, 2008, https://www.cfr.org/blog/where-my-swap-line-and-will-diffusion-financial-power-balkanize-global-response-broadening .

2 . FOMC meeting, October 28–29, 2008.

3 . M. J. Burrows and J. Harris, “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis,” Washington Quarterly 32, no. 2 (2009), 27–38.

4 . Conférence de presse, November 14, 2008, http://discours.vie-publique.fr/notices/087003590.html .

5 . V. Feklyunina and S. White, “Discourses of ‘Krizis’: Economic Crisis in Russia and Regime Legitimacy,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27 (2011), 385–406.

6 . N. Robinson, “Russia’s Response to Crisis: The Paradox of Success,” https://www.academia.edu/2125038/Russia_s_Response_to_Crisis_The_Paradox_of_Success?auto=download .

7 . S. Guriev and A. Tsyvinski, “Challenges Facing the Russian Economy After the Crisis,” in A. Åslund, S. Guriev and A. Kuchins, eds., Russia After the Global Economic Crisis (New York: Columbia University, 2010), 9–38.

8 . L. Harding, “Russia’s Oligarchs Lose 70% of Their Wealth in a Year,” Guardian, April 17, 2009.

9 . World Bank in Russia, Russia Economic Report 18 (March 2009).

10 . A. E. Kramer, “A $50 Billion Bailout in Russia Favors the Rich and Connected,” New York Times, October 30, 2008.

11 . S. Johnson, “The Quiet Coup,” Atlantic, May 1, 2009, 1.

12 . C. G. Gaddy and B. W. Ickes, “Russia After the Global Financial Crisis,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 51, no. 3 (2010), 281–311.

13 . J. Conrad, “Russia in the Financial Crisis and Beyond,” Deutsche Bank Research, December 11, 2009.

14 . “The Financial Crisis in Russia,” Stratfor, October 28, 2008, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/financial-crisis-russia .

15 . World Bank in Russia, Russian Economic Report 17 (November 2008).

16 . S. Crowley, “Monotowns and the Political Economy of Industrial Restructuring in Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 32, no. 5 (2016), 397–422.

17 . J. Jungmann and B. Sagemann, eds., Financial Crisis in Eastern Europe: Road to Recovery (Wiesbaden: Gabler, 2011), 433.

18 . M. Korostikov, “Russia and China: Against the Storm,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27, no. 3-4 (2011), 605–631.

19 . Gaddy and Ickes, “Russia After the Global Financial Crisis,” 281–311.

20 . Russian Analytical Digest 63 (July 7, 2009), http://www.laender-analysen.de/russland/rad/pdf/Russian_Analytical_Digest_63.pdf .

21 . S. Fortescue, “Putin in Pikalevo: PR or Watershed?,” Australian Slavonic and East European Studies 23, nos. 1–2 (2010), 19–38.

22 . Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy, 332–341.

23 . D. Medvedev, “Go Russia!,” September 10, 2009, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/5413 .

24 . D. Medvedev, “Speech at Meeting of Council of Legislators,” December 28, 2009, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/6497 .

25 . P. P. Pan, “Medvedev Calls for Economic Changes,” Washington Post, November 13, 2009.

26 . For a salutary stress on diversity across the region see E. Berglöf, Y. Korniyenko, J. Zettelmeyer and A. Plekhanov, “Understanding the Crisis in Emerging Europe,” (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Working Paper No. 109, 2009).

27 . Danske Bank Research, “Euro Area: Exposure to the Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe,” February 24, 2009.

28 . EBRD Transition Report 2015–2016 (London: EBRD, 2016), 12.

29 . I. Kaminska, “The EE Mortgage,” Financial Times, October 24, 2008.

30 . L. Thomas Jr., “Politics Add to Economic Turmoil in Hungary,” New York Times, April 1, 2009.

31 . FOMC meeting, October 28–29, 2008.

32 . Ibid.

33 . S. Vallée, “Behind Closed Doors at the ECB,” Financial Times, March 30, 2010.

34 . R. A. Auer, S. Kraenzlin and D. Liebeg, “How Do Austrian Banks Fund Their Swiss Franc Exposure?,” Austrian National Bank Financial Stability Report (2012), 54–61.

35 . L. Andor, “Hungary in the Financial Crisis: A (Basket) Case Study,” Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe 17, no. 3 (2009): 285–296; L. Calmfors et al., “The Hungarian Crisis,” EEAG Report on the European Economy (2012), 115–130; and T. Egedy, “The Effects of Global Economic Crisis in Hungary,” Hungarian Geographical Bulletin 61, no. 2 (2012), 155–173.

36 . S. Lütz and M. Kranke, “The European Rescue of the Washington Consensus? EU and IMF Lending to Central and Eastern European Countries,” Review of International Political Economy 21, no. 2 (2014), 310–338.

37 . “Days of New Flats, Cars and Generous State Benefits Over as Currency Collapses,” Guardian, October 28, 2008.

38 . J. A. Cordero, “The IMF’s Stand-by Arrangements and the Economic Downturn in Eastern Europe: The Cases of Hungary, Latvia, and Ukraine,” CEPR, September 2009.

39 . IMF, “Review of Recent Crisis Programs,” September 14, 2009.

40 . L. Barber, C. Giles, S. Wagstyl and T. Barber, “Zoellick Urges EU to Help East Europe,” Financial Times, February 18, 2009.

41 . “Keep Calm and Carry On,” Economist, February 19, 2009.

42 . A. Evans-Pritchard, “Failure to Save East Europe Will Lead to Worldwide Meltdown,” Telegraph, February 14, 2009. Z. Kudrna and D. Gabor, “The Return of Political Risk: Foreign-Owned Banks in Emerging Europe,” Europe-Asia Studies 65(3) (2013), 548–66.

43 . Z. Darvas, “The EU’s Role in Supporting Crisis-Hit Countries in Central and Eastern Europe,” Bruegel Policy Contribution No. 2009/17 2009.

44 . E. Hugh, “Let the East into the Eurozone Now!,” February 20, 2009, http://fistfulofeuros.net/afoe/let-the-east-into-the-eurozone-now/ .

45 . S. Wagstyl, “IMF Urges Eastern EU to Adopt Euro,” Financial Times, April 5, 2009.

46 . R. De Haas et al., “Foreign Banks and the Vienna Initiative: Turning Sinners into Saints?” (IMF Working Paper 12-117, 2012). The effectiveness of the initiative is suggested in Berglöf, Korniyenko, Zettelmeyer and Plekhanov, “Understanding the Crisis,” who find that cross-border bank ownership helped to stabilize lending.

47 . EBRD, EIB and World Bank, Final Report on the Joint IFI Action Plan (March 2011). According to officials of the German finance ministry they undertook action at a national level to hold the German lenders in line.

48 . Blustein, Off Balance, Kindle location 1816.

49 . C. Dougherty, “Sweden Aids Bailout of Baltic Nations,” New York Times, March 12, 2009.

50 . “Latvia: Will It Start a Dangerous Domino Effect?,” May 6, 2009, http://www.economonitor.com/analysts/author/mstokes/ .

51 . L. Nyberg, “The Baltic Region in the Shadow of the Financial Crisis,” BIS Review 105 (2009); and Y. Koyama, “Economic Crisis in the Baltic States: Focusing on Latvia,” Economic Annals 55, no. 186 (2010), 89–114.

52 . A. Evans-Pritchard, “Latvian Debt Crisis Shakes Eastern Europe,” Telegraph, June 3, 2009.

53 . O. J. Blanchard, M. Griffiths and B. Gruss, “Boom, Bust, Recovery: Forensics of the Latvia Crisis,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2 (2013), 325–388.

54 . Darvas, “The EU’s Role.”

55 . J. Sommers and C. Woolfson, The Contradictions of Austerity: The Socio-Economic Costs of the Neoliberal Baltic Model (New York: Routledge, 2014).

56 . J. Brundsen, “Brexit Gives Valdis Dombrovskis Big Sway over Banks,” Financial Times, June 30, 2016.

57 . D. Arel, “Ukraine Since the War in Georgia,” Survival 50, no. 6 (2008), 15–25.

58 . A. Mayhew, “The Economic and Financial Crisis: Impacts on an Emerging Economy-Ukraine” (SEI Working Paper 115, 2010).

59 . A. Åslund, “Ukraine: Worst Hit by the Financial Crisis,” George Washington University, February 23, 2009, https://www2.gwu.edu/~iiep/assets/docs/aslund_ukraine_23feb09.pdf .

60 . A. Åslund, “Ukraine’s Financial Crisis, 2009,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 50, no. 4 (2009), 371–386.

61 . R. Connolly and N. Copsey, “The Great Slump of 2008–9 and Ukraine’s Integration with the European Union,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27, no. 3-4 (2011), 541–565.

62 . K. Westphal, “Russian Gas, Ukrainian Pipelines, and European Supply Security: Lessons of the 2009 Controversies,” SWP research paper, September 11, 2009.

63 . T. Alloway, “Domino Theory, Eastern Europe Edition,” Financial Times, February 16, 2009.

CHAPTER 10: THE WIND FROM THE EAST: CHINA

1 . A. Tsygankov, “What Is China to Us? Westernizers and Sinophiles in Russian Foreign Policy,” Russia.Nei.Visions 45 December 2009.

2 . D. W. Drezner, “Bad Debts: Assessing China’s Financial Influence in Great Power Politics,” International Security 34, no. 2 (2009), 7–45.

3 . “Fannie, Freddie Failure Would Be World ‘Catastrophe,’” Bloomberg, August 22, 2008, reported by https://mises.org/blog/fannie-freddie-failure-would-be-world-catastrophe .

4 . J. Fallows, “Be Nice to the Countries That Lend You Money,” Atlantic, December 2008, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/12/be-nice-to-the-countries-that-lend-you-money/307148/ .

5 . Drezner, “Bad Debts.”

6 . W. M. Morrison and M. Labonte, “China’s Holdings of US Securities: Implications for the US Economy,” Current Politics and Economics of Northern and Western Asia 20, no. 3 (2011), 507.

7 . “A Truer Picture of China’s Export Machine,” McKinsey Quarterly (September 2010), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/a-truer-picture-of-chinas-export-machine .

8 . “The Decoupling Debate,” Economist, March 6, 2008.

9 . J. Yardley, “China to Streamline Government into ‘Super Ministries,’” New York Times, March 11, 2008.

10 . S. Minggao and H. Yin, “Macroreview: Crisis Tests Strength of China’s Export Muscle,” http://english.caijing.com.cn/2009-08-19/110227250.html .

11 . For this rough figure, see S. Fardoust, J. Yifu and L. X. Luo, “Demystifying China’s Fiscal Stimulus,” World Bank (Policy Research Working Paper 6221, 2012). For a more detailed treatment, see C. Fang and K. Wing Chan, “The Global Economic Crisis and Unemployment in China,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 50, no, 5 (2009), 513–531.

12 . B. Naughton, “Understanding the Chinese Stimulus Package,” China Leadership Monitor 28, no. 2 (2009), 1–12.

13 . D. Schmidt and S. Heilmann, “Dealing with Economic Crisis in 2008–2009,” China Analysis 77 (January 2010), www.chinapolitik.de ; see also http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2015/12/14/china/the-party-planners-five-year-plans-in-china/ .

14 . For this and the following quotes, see Naughton, “Understanding the Chinese Stimulus Package,” 1–12.

15 . C. Sorace, “China’s Vision for Developing Sichuan’s Post-Earthquake Countryside: Turning Unruly Peasants into Grateful Urban Citizens,” China Quarterly 218 (2014), 404–427.

16 . J. Kirkegaard, “China’s Experimental Pragmatics of ‘Scientific Development’ in Wind Power: Algorithmic Struggles over Software in Wind Turbines,” Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (2016), 5–24.

17 . H. Yu, “Universal Health Insurance Coverage for 1.3 Billion People: What Accounts for China’s Success?,” Health Policy 119, no. 9 (September 2015): 1145–1152.

18 . Naughton, “Understanding,” 8.

19 . G. Ollivier, J. Sondhi and N. Zhou, “High-Speed Railways in China: A Look at Construction Costs,” World Bank China Transport Topics 9 (July 2014).

20 . So much so that Obama’s enthusiasm attracted critical attention. “Obama Needs to Get Over His China Envy,” Baltimore Sun, November 5, 2011, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/bal-obama-needs-to-get-over-his-china-envy-20111104-story.html .

21 . S. Breslin, “China and the Crisis: Global Power, Domestic Caution and Local Initiative,” Contemporary Politics 17, no. 2 (2011), 185–200.

22 . IMF, “Survey: China’s Difficult Rebalancing Act,” September 2007, http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/socar0912a .

23 . A. Wheatley, “Calculating the Coming Slowdown in China,” New York Times, May 23, 2011.

24 . “China Seeks Stimulation,” Economist, November 10, 2008.

25 . Fardoust, Yifu and Luo, “Demystifying China’s Fiscal Stimulus.”

26 . Naughton, “Understanding,” 10.

27 . Fardoust, Yifu and Luo, “Demystifying China’s Fiscal Stimulus,” figure 2.

28 . B. Naughton, “Reading the NPC: Post-Crisis Economic Dilemmas of the Chinese Leadership,” China Leadership Monitor 32 (2010), 1–10.

29 . Naughton, “Understanding,” 3.

30 . A. Szamosszegi and C. Kyle, An Analysis of State-Owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 2011), 1–116.

31 . C. E. Walter and F. J. T. Howie, Red Capitalism (Singapore: Wiley, 2012).

32 . N. Lardy, Sustaining China’s Economic Growth (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

33 . A. Collier, Shadow Banking and the Rise of Capitalism in China (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

34 . N.-L. Sum, “A Cultural Political Economy of Crisis Recovery: (Trans-) National Imaginaries of ‘BRIC’ and Subaltern Groups in China,” Economy and Society 42 no. 4 (2013), 543–570.

35 . Schmidt and Heilmann, “Dealing with Economic Crisis in 2008–2009.”

36 . C. Wong, “The Fiscal Stimulus Program and Problems of Macroeconomic Management in China,” 2011, https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/48143862.pdf ; and C. Wong, “The Fiscal Stimulus Programme and Public Governance Issues in China,” OECD Journal on Budgeting 2011/3, https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/49633058.pdf .

37 . Fardoust, Yifu and Luo, “Demystifying China’s Fiscal Stimulus.”

38 . D. Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China,” Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011), 7–27.

39 . G. Qian, “How Should We Read China’s ‘Discourse of Greatness,’” China Media Project, http://cmp.hku.hk/2010/02/23/4565/ (accessed December 8, 2010).

40 . “In Wake of Stronger Growth, More Americans and Europeans Say US Is Top Economic Power,” July 2, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/07/02/in-wake-of-stronger-growth-more-americans-and-europeans-say-u-s-is-top-economic-power/ .

41 . T. M. Cheung, “Dragon on the Horizon: China’s Defense Industrial Renaissance,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 1 (2009): 29–66.

42 . “What Does China Really Spend on Its Military?,” http://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/ .

43 . T. Shanker and M. Mazzetti, “China and US Clash on Naval Fracas,” New York Times, March 10, 2009.

44 . “UPDATE 3-Geithner Tells China Its Dollar Assets Are Safe,” Reuters, May 31, 2009.

45 . Shambaugh, “Coping with a Conflicted China.”

46 . National Intelligence Council Global Trends 2025 (Washington, DC, 2008); and K. Liao, “The Pentagon and the Pivot,” Survival 55, no. 3 (2013), 95–114.

47 . J. Fallows, “Be Nice to the Countries That Lend You Money.”

CHAPTER 11: G20

1 . C. Pereira and J. A. de Castro Neves, “Brazil and China: South-South Partnership or North-South Competition?” Brookings Policy Paper Number 26, March 2011.

2 . A. Ahuja and M. S. Nabar, “Investment-Led Growth in China: Global Spillovers” (IMF Working Paper 12/267, 2012).

3 . OECD, Maddison Project database, http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/data.htm .

4 . J. R. Blöndal, I. Hawkesworth and H.-D. Choi, “Budgeting in Indonesia,” OECD Journal on Budgeting 9, no. 2 (2009), 49.

5 . A. Doraisami, “Macro-Economic Policy Responses to Financial Crises in Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 44, no. 4 (2014), 581–598.

6 . M. Fackler, “South Koreans Reliving Nightmare of Last Financial Crisis,” New York Times, October 24, 2008.

7 . H. Cho, South Korea’s Experience with Banking Sector Liberalisation (research report, Amsterdam, 2010); and T. Kalinowski and H. Cho, “The Political Economy of Financial Liberalization in South Korea: State, Big Business, and Foreign Investors,” Asian Survey 49, no. 2 (2009), 221–242.

8 . H. Cho, South Korea’s Experience with Global Financial Crisis (Ontario: North-South Institute, 2012), 10.

9 . J. Ree, K. Yoon and H. Park, “FX Funding Risks and Exchange Rate Volatility–Korea’s Case” (IMF Working Paper 12-268, 2012).

10 . B. Eichengreen, Exorbitant Privilege: The Rise and Fall of the Dollar and the Future of the International Monetary System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 168.

11 . H. C. Chung, “The Bank of Korea’s Policy Response to the Global Financial Crisis,” Bank for International Settlements Paper 54 (2010), 257.

12 . J. Chomthongdi, “Thailand and the World Financial Crisis: How Will Civil Unrest Further Damage Thailand’s Economic Position?,” April 20, 2009, http://www.theglobalist.com/thailand-and-the-world-financial-crisis/ ; and S. Chirathivat and S. Mallikamas. “Thailand’s Economic Performance and Responses to the Global Crisis,” Proceedings of Asia After the Crisis Conference, 2010.

13 . M. Z. Abidin and R. Rasiah, “The Global Financial Crisis and the Malaysian Economy: Impact and Responses” (Kuala Lumpur: UNDP Malaysia, 2009).

14 . K. Sangsubhan and M. C. Basri, “Global Financial Crisis and ASEAN: Fiscal Policy Response in the Case of Thailand and Indonesia,” Asian Economic Policy Review 7, no. 2 (2012), 248–269.

15 . M. C. Basri and S. Rahardja, “Mild Crisis, Half Hearted Fiscal Stimulus: Indonesia During the GFC,” Assessment on the Impact of Stimulus, Fiscal Transparency and Fiscal Risk ( ERIA Research Project Report 1,2010), 169–211.

16 . E. Chew, “Malaysia Stimulus Tops $16 Billion,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2009.

17 . A. Maierbrugger, “1MDB Scandal: Next Suspect Goldman Sachs Banker,” February 15, 2016, http://investvine.com/1mdb-scandal-next-suspect-goldman-sachs-banker/ .

18 . “Chronology of Korean Responses to the Financial Crisis,” New York Times, October 19, 2008.

19 . N. Baba and I. Shim, “Policy Responses to Dislocations in the FX Swap Market: The Experience of Korea,” BIS Quarterly Review, June 2010.

20 . T. Kalinowski, “The Politics of Market Reforms: Korea’s Path from Chaebol Republic to Market Democracy and Back,” Contemporary Politics 15, no. 3 (2009), 287–304.

21 . T. Kalinowski, “Crisis Management and the Diversity of Capitalism: Fiscal Stimulus Packages and the East Asian (Neo-)Developmental State,” Economy and Society 44, no. 2 (2015), 244–270.

22 . FOMC meeting, October 28–29, 2008.

23 . R. H. Wade, “Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF,” Politics & Society 39, no. 3 (2011), 347–378.

24 . J. Kirton, G20 Governance for a Globalized World (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013).

25 . “Norway Takes Aim at G-20,” Spiegel Online, June 22, 2010.

26 . Culminating in the UN Conference at the Highest Level on the World Financial and Economic Crisis and Its Impact on Development, June 2009, http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/uneconference.shtml .

27 . Darling, Back from the Brink, 193.

28 . Seldon, Brown at 10, 45.

29 . Washington press conference with Gordon Brown and Alistair Darling, Saturday, November 15, 2008, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090330160949 [inactive]; http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page17514 [inactive].

30 . Seldon, Brown at 10, Kindle locations 7411–7417.

31 . J. Beale, “Lofty Ambitions for Obama’s Visit,” BBC News, March 31, 2009.

32 . Seldon, Brown at 10, Kindle locations 7660–7663.

33 . For a discussion, see E. Helleiner and J. Kirschner, eds., The Great Wall of Money (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014). For the original, see “Zhou Xiaochuan: Reform the International Monetary System,” March 23, 2009, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130724/2842945/index.html .

34 . J. Zhongxia, “The Chinese Delegation at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference: Reflections for 2015,” https://www.omfif.org/media/1067515/chinese-reflections-on-bretton-woods-by-jin-zhongxia.pdf .

35 . M. P. Dooley, D. Folkerts-Landau and P. Garber, “The Revived Bretton Woods System,” International Journal of Finance and Economics 9, no. 4 (October 2004), 307–313.

36 . On the China rebalancing effort, see B. Setser, “The Balance of Financial Terror, Circa August 9, 2007,” https://www.cfr.org/blog/balance-financial-terror-circa-august-9-2007 .

37 . UN, “Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System,” New York, September 2009.

38 . G. C. Chang, “China’s Assault on the Dollar,” March 26, 2009, https://www.forbes.com/2009/03/26/zhou-xiaochuan-geithner-renminbi-currency-opinions-columnists-dollar.html .

39 . J. Kollewe, “Global Currency Flies with Push from Russia and Slip from Timothy Geithner,” Guardian, March 26, 2009.

40 . A. Lane, “In Defending US Currency, Bachmann Distorts Geithner’s Comments About Dollar,” April 1, 2009, http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2009/apr/01/michele-bachmann/defending-dollar-bachmann-distorts-geithners-comme/ .

41 . E. S. Prasad, The Dollar Trap: How the US Dollar Tightened Its Grip on Global Finance (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014).

42 . H. Cooper, “On the World Stage, Obama Issues an Overture,” New York Times, April 2, 2009.

43 . Joint press conference with Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, April 1, 2009, https://ca.ambafrance.org/Joint-press-conference-with-Angela .

44 . For the following, A. Rawnsley, The End of the Party (London: Penguin, 2010).

45 . P. Blustein, Laid Low: Inside the Crisis That Overwhelmed Europe and the IMF (Waterloo, Ontario: CIGI, 2016), 75.

46 . N. Woods, “Global Governance After the Financial Crisis: A New Multilateralism or the Last Gasp of the Great Powers?,” Global Policy 1, no. 1 (2010), 51–63.

47 . For the following, Rawnsley, The End of the Party, ibook location 4218–4351.

48 . “Transcript: Obama’s G20 Press Conference,” April 2, 2009, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-obamas-g20-press-conference/ .

49 . A. Sparrow, K. Baldwin and H. Stewart, “Today’s G20 Deal Will Solve Financial Crisis, Claims Gordon Brown,” Guardian, April 2, 2009.

50 . M. Rosie and H. Gorringe, “What a Difference a Death Makes: Protest, Policing and the Press at the G20,” Sociological Research Online 14, no. 5 (2009), 4.

51 . “King Warns Against More Spending,” BBC News, March 24, 2009.

52 . P. Aldrick, “Failed Gilt Auction Stokes Fears over UK Economy,” Telegraph, March 25, 2009.

53 . M. Gove, “Coyote Ugly: G20 Finally Pushes Prudence into the Abyss,” Scotsman, March 28, 2009.

54 . P. Wintour and N. Watt, “Gordon Brown: A Statesman Abroad, Under Fire Back Home,” Guardian, March 25, 2009.

55 . “London Summit—Leaders’ Statement,” April 2, 2009, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2009/pdf/g20_040209.pdf .

56 . N.-L. Sum, “A Cultural Political Economy of Crisis Recovery.”

57 . Germany’s modest discretionary stimulus in early 2009 would later rise due to tax cuts following the elections of September 2009.

CHAPTER 12: STIMULUS

1 . S. Erlanger and S. Castle, “European Leader Assails American Stimulus Plan,” New York Times, March 25, 2009.

2 . A. White, “EU Presidency: US Stimulus Is ‘The Road to Hell,’” San Diego Tribune, March 25, 2009.

3 . Rawnsley, End of the Party, ibook location 4309.

4 . N. Sheiber, The Escape Artists: How Obama’s Team Fumbled the Recovery (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), 96.

5 . R. Lizza, “The Obama Memos,” New Yorker, January 30, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01/30/the-obama-memos .

6 . M. Grunwald, The New New Deal: The Hidden Story of Change in the Obama Era (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012).

7 . D. Loewe, “Obama’s Blues Agenda,” Guardian, February 13, 2009.

8 . J. Green, “The Elusive Green Economy,” Atlantic, July/August 2009, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2009/07/the-elusive-green-economy/307554/ .

9 . M. Grabell, Money Well Spent? The Truth Behind the Trillion-Dollar Stimulus, the Biggest Economic Recovery Plan in History (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012).

10 . B. Dupor, “The Recovery Act of 2009 vs. FDR’s New Deal: Which Was Bigger?,” https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/first_quarter_2017/the-recovery-act-of-2009-vs-fdrs-new-deal-which-was-bigger .

11 . F. Reichling, “Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and Economic Output from October 2011 Through December 2011,” Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, 2012. This broadly concurs with T. G. Conley and B. Dupor, “The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act: Solely a Government Jobs Program?,” Journal of Monetary Economics 60.5 (2013), 535–549.

12 . Council of Economic Advisers, “The Economic Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Five Years Later” (final report to Congress, February 2014).

13 . P. Krugman, End This Depression Now; and Eichengreen, Hall of Mirrors, 297–301.

14 . C. Romer and J. Bernstein, “The Job Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan,” January 9, 2009, https://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/The_Job_Impact_of_the_American_Recovery_and_Reinvestment_Plan.pdf .

15 . N. Barofksy, Bailout: An Inside Account of How Washington Abandoned Main Street While Rescuing Wall Street (New York: Free Press, 2012).

16 . The figure of 9.3 million homes lost is an estimate by the National Association of Realtors cited in L. Kusisto, “Many Who Lost Homes to Foreclosure in Last Decade Won’t Return,” Wall Street Journal, April 20, 2015. See also “The End Is in Sight for the US Foreclosure Crisis,” December 3, 2016, https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/housing-market-perspectives/issue-3-dec-2016/the-end-is-in-sight-for-the-us-foreclosure-crisis .

17 . “Lawrence Summers on ‘House of Debt,’” Financial Times, June 6, 2014.

18 . R. Suskind, Confidence Men .

19 . R. E. Rubin, P. R. Orszag and A. Sinai, “Sustained Budget Deficits: The Risk of Financial and Fiscal Disarray,” AEA-NAEFA Joint Session, Allied Social Science Associations Annual Meetings, 2004.

20 . P. Mauro, M. A. Horton and M. S. Kumar, “The State of Public Finances: A Cross-Country Fiscal Monitor,” IMF, 2009.

21 . “Budget of the US Government Fiscal Year 2011,” https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2011-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2011-BUD.pdf .

22 . IMF, Fiscal Monitor , Washington, DC, May 2010.

23 . Editorial, “The Bond Vigilantes,” Wall Street Journal, May 29, 2009.

24 . Scheiber, Escape Artists, 151; and Suskind, Confidence Men, 516.

25 . Scheiber, Escape Artists, 150.

26 . A. P. Lerner, “Functional Finance and the Federal Debt,” Social Research (1943), 38–51.

27 . D. Gabor and C. Ban, “Banking on Bonds: The New Links Between States and Markets,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54, no. 3 (2016), 617–635.

28 . Bastasin, Saving Europe, 110–111.

29 . D. Gabor, “The ECB and the Eurozone Debt Crisis” (ND), https://www.academia.edu/868218/The_ECB_and_the_European_Debt_Crisis , and D. Gabor, “The Power of Collateral: The ECB and Bank Funding Strategies in Crisis,” May 18, 2012, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2062315 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2062315 . To supplement the LTRO operations the ECB also operated a smaller scheme to support the covered bond market.

30 . IIF, “Interim Report on the Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of Proposed Changes in the Banking Regulatory Framework,” June 2010, 26.

31 . M. Dettmer, D. Kurbjuweit, R. Nelles, R. Neukirch und C. Reiermann, “Diebische Freude,” Spiegel, January 12, 2009.

32 . OECD, Public Debt Markets: Trends and Recent Structural Trends (Paris: OECD, 2002).

33 . “Konjunkturpaket II,” Spiegel, January 27, 2009.

34 . “Konjunkturpaket,” Spiegel, January 6, 2009.

35 . C. Reiermann, “Goldener Zuegel,” Spiegel, February 9, 2009.

36 . F. Gathmann, “Einigung zur Schuldenbremse,” Spiegel, February 6, 2009; and “Finanzhilfen für ärmere Länder,” Spiegel, February 13, 2009.

37 . “Foederalismusreform,” Spiegel, March 27, 2009.

38 . “Fuehrende Oekonomen verteufeln die Schuldenbremse,” Handelsblatt, February 13, 2009; and S. Dullien, “Kommentar,” Spiegel, February 9, 2009.

39 . “Schlacht um die Schuldenbremse,” Manager Magazin, January 16, 2009.

40 . D. Hawranek, et al., “Gipfel am Abgrund,” Spiegel, March 30, 2009.

41 . Kuttner, Presidency in Peril, 78–79.

42 . Suskind, Confidence Men, 656.

43 . Scheiber, Escape Artists, 150.

44 . IMF, Fiscal Monitor, Washington, DC, November 2010.

CHAPTER 13: FIXING FINANCE

1 . OECD, Economic Outlook No. 85 (June 2009).

2 . “Acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America,” June 5, 2009, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20090625a.htm .

3 . “Citigroup Stock Sinks to an All-Time Low of 97 Cents,” May 4, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/05/citigroup-stock-sinks-to_n_172167.html .

4 . P. Wintour and J. Treanor, “RBS Bonuses to Reach £775m Despite Treasury Tough Talk,” Guardian, February 17, 2009,

5 . B. White, “What Red Ink? Wall Street Paid Hefty Bonuses,” New York Times, January 28, 2009.

6 . G. Farrell and J. Macintosh, “Merrill Delivered Bonuses Before BofA Deal,” Financial Times, January 21, 2009.

7 . “Obama’s Statement on AIG,” New York Times, March 16, 2009.

8 . K. Guha and E. Luce, “Greenspan Backs Bank Nationalization,” Financial Times, February 17, 2009.

9 . “Nationalization: Is It the Only Answer to Save Banks?,” February 15, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/WN/Economy/story?id=6885587 .

10 . “Obama: Swedish Model Would Be Impossible Here,” February 11, 2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-swedish-model-would-be-impossible-here-2009-2 .

11 . J. Cassidy, “No Credit Timothy Geithner’s Financial Plan Is Working—And Making Him Very Unpopular,” New Yorker, March 15, 2010, http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/03/15/no-credit-2#ixzz0haHEOfV7 .

12 . Suskind, Confidence Men, 397–464.

13 . Bair, Bull by the Horns , Kindle location 3032.

14 . S. Johnson and J. Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown (New York: Pantheon Books, 2010).

15 . Suskind, Confidence Men, 455–460, 695. Geithner issued a public denial: “Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jay Carney, Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner, and OMB Director Jack Lew,” September 19, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/19/press-briefing-press-secretary-jay-carney-treasury-secretary-tim-geithne .

16 . E. Javers, “Inside Obama’s Bank CEOs Meeting,” Politico, March 4, 2009, http://www.politico.com/story/2009/04/inside-obamas-bank-ceos-meeting-020871 .

17 . Geithner, Stress Test, 376.

18 . DealBook, “Geithner Haunted by a Goldman Past He Never Had,” New York Times, August 19, 2010.

19 . Geithner’s calendar: https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/documents/geithner-schedule-new-york-fed .

20 . A. Clark, “Diary Shows Geithner-Darling Contact During Crisis,” Guardian, October 11, 2009.

21 . Scheiber, Escape Artists, 38.

22 . J. Anderson, “Calm Before and During a Storm,” New York Times, February 9, 2007.

23 . Suskind, Confidence Men, 455.

24 . Federal Reserve, “The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program: Design and Implementation,” April 24, 2009, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090424a1.pdf . As Kuttner, Presidency in Peril, 151, points out, the stress test team was grossly underpowered given the complexity of the businesses they were examining.

25 . Geithner, Stress Test, 345–350.

26 . D. Enrich, D. Fitzpatrick and M. Eckblad, “Banks Won Concessions on Tests,” Wall Street Journal, May 9, 2009.

27 . Bair, Bull by the Horns, Kindle location 2843; and F. Guerrera and J. Eaglesham, “Citi Under Fire over Deferred Tax Assets,” Financial Times, September 6, 2010.

28 . Scheiber, Escape Artists, 128.

29 . On Citi, Kuttner, Presidency in Peril, 129.

30 . SIGTARP, “Exiting TARP: Repayments by the Largest Financial Institutions,” September 29, 2011.

31 . Bair, Bull by the Horns, Kindle location 3686.

32 . D. Baker and T. McArthur, “The Value of the ‘Too Big to Fail’ Big Bank Subsidy,” CEPR, 2009.

33 . An outstanding road map to the passage of Dodd-Frank can be found in A. S. Blinder, When the Music Stopped: The Financial Crisis, the Response and the Work Ahead (New York: Penguin, 2013), 263–366. For contending political accounts, see Geithner, Stress Test, 388–438; Bernanke, Courage to Act, 435–466; and S. Bair, Bull by the Horns, Kindle location 3223–4339.

34 . “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” Public Law 111–203, July 21, 2010, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-111publ203/pdf/PLAW-111publ203.pdf .

35 . US Treasury, “Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation,” Washington, DC, 2009.

36 . Geithner, Stress Test, 399.

37 . Pew Research Center, “Americans’ Views of Fed Depend on Their Politics,” December 16, 2015, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/12/16/americans-views-of-fed-depend-on-their-politics/ .

38 . “Ben Bernanke,” Time, December 16, 2009.

39 . Bernanke, Courage to Act, 430–434.

40 . S. A. Binder, “Ben Bernanke’s Second Term as Chairman of the Federal Reserve,” January 30, 2010, https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/ben-bernankes-second-term-as-chairman-of-the-federal-reserve/ ; and S. Chan, “Senate, Weakly, Backs New Term for Bernanke,” New York Times, January 28, 2010.

41 . Bernanke, Courage to Act, 445–447.

42 . Geithner, Stress Test, 404.

43 . Ibid., 432.

44 . Ibid., 398.

45 . “The United States Residential Foreclosure Crisis: Ten Years Later,” March 2017, http://www.corelogic.com/research/foreclosure-report/national-foreclosure-report-10-year.pdf .

46 . “Life After Lehman,” September 13, 2013, http://www.institutionalinvestor.com/Article/3254651/Life-After-Lehman-A-Look-at-How-6-Prominent-Players-Have-Fared.html#.Wavm3ZOGN0s .

47 . S. Grocer, “Banks Set Record for Pay,” Wall Street Journal, January 14, 2010.

48 . T. M. Tse, “Goldman Sachs Earns $13 bn in 2009,” Washington Post, January 22, 2010.

49 . Gasparino, Bought and Paid For, 6.

50 . Bair, Bull by the Horns , Kindle location 3924–3971.

51 . D. Polk, “Dodd-Frank Progress Report.” July 2013, https://www.davispolk.com/files/Jul2013_Dodd.Frank_.Progress.Report.pdf .

52 . Blinder, After the Music Stopped, 314–319.

53 . B. Protess and P. Eavis, “At the Finish Line on the Volcker Rule,” New York Times, December 10, 2013.

54 . PWC, “Volcker Rule Clarity: Waiting for Godot,” May 2014, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/regulatory-services/publications/volcker-rule-clarity-waiting-for-godot.html .

55 . B. Protess, “Jamie Dimon Shows Some Love for Volcker Rule,” New York Times, May 21, 2012.

56 . P. Clement, “The Term ‘Macroprudential’: Origins and Evolution 1,” BIS Quarterly Review, 2010, 59.

57 . D. Skeel, The New Financial Deal: Understanding the Dodd-Frank Act and Its (Unintended) Consequences (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010).

58 . Federal Reserve, “The Supervisory Capital Assessment Program, May 2009, https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/bcreg20090507a1.pdf .

59 . Federal Reserve, “Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2013: Supervisory Stress Test Methodology and Results,” March 28, 2013, https://www.federalreserve.gov/bankinforeg/stress-tests/appendix-b.htm .

60 . “Rules and Regulations,” Federal Register 76, no. 231 (December 1, 2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-01/pdf/2011-30665.pdf .

61 . Federal Reserve, “Federal Reserve Board Issues Final Rule on Annual Capital Plans, Launches 2012 Review,” https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20111122a.htm .

62 . P. Jenkins and P. J. Davies, “Thirty Financial Groups on Systemic Risk List,” Financial Times, November 30, 2009.

63 . See the collective letter “Healthy Banking System Is the Goal, Not Profitable Banks,” Financial Times, November 8, 2010; and A. Admati and M. Hellwig, The Bankers’ New Clothes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).

64 . IIF, “Interim Report on the Cumulative Impact on the Global Economy of Proposed Changes in the Banking Regulatory Framework Institute of International Finance,” June 2010.

65 . Bair, Bull by the Horns, Kindle location 4731–4748.

66 . FSB, “Policy Measures to Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions,” November 4, 2011.

67 . The High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU chaired by Jacques de Larosière, Report, February 25, 2009, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf .

68 . A point I owe to Shahin Vallée.

69 . M. Goldstein and N. Véron, “Too Big to Fail: The Transatlantic Debate” (Bruegel working paper 2011/03, 2011).

70 . A. S. Posen and N. Véron, “A Solution for Europe’s Banking Problem,” Bruegel Policy Brief (2009).

71 . IMF, Global Financial Stability Report (April 2009).

72 . “Bafin beziffert Kreditrisiken auf 816 Milliarden Euro,” Spiegel, April 24, 2009.

73 . Eichengreen, Hall of Mirrors, 323.

74 . Geithner, Stress Test, 425–426.

CHAPTER 14: GREECE 2010: EXTEND AND PRETEND

1 . In full agreement with Sandbu, Europe’s Orphan ; E. Jones, “The Forgotten Financial Union: How You Can Have a Euro Crisis Without a Euro,” in The Future of the Euro, ed. M. Matthijs and M. Blyth (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); and D. Mabbett and W. Schelkle, “What Difference Does Euro Membership Make to Stabilization? The Political Economy of International Monetary Systems Revisited,” Review of International Political Economy 22.3 (2015), 508–534.

2 . J. M. Brown, “Things Fall Apart,” Financial Times, January 15, 2009; and C. Lapavitsas et al., Crisis in the Eurozone (London: Verso, 2012), 58.

3 . Z. Darvas, “The EU’s Role in Supporting Crisis-Hit Countries in Central and Eastern Europe,” Bruegel Policy Contribution (December 17, 2009).

4 . S. Kalyvas, Modern Greece: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

5 . G. Papaconstantinou, Game Over: The Inside Story of the Greek Crisis (Athens: George Papaconstantinou, 2016).

6 . On the politics of creditor-led, as opposed to debtor-led, default, see Lapavistas et al., Crisis in the Eurozone, 126–135.

7 . M. Walker, C. Forelle and B. Blackstone, “On the Secret Committee to Save the Euro, a Dangerous Divide,” Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2010.

8 . Papaconstantinou, Game Over .

9 . V. Acharya and S. Steffen, “The Banking Crisis as a Giant Carry Trade Gone Wrong,” VoxEU , May 23, 2013.

10 . S. Wagstyl, “Greeks Search for Hint of Daylight Between Schäuble and Merkel,” Financial Times, February 19, 2015.

11 . For an interpretation that sees it as the key to the entire policy of Merkel’s government, see H. Thompson, “Germany and the Euro-Zone Crisis: The European Reformation of the German Banking Crisis and the Future of the Euro,” New Political Economy 20, no. 6 (2015), 851–870.

12 . B. Benoit and T. Barber, “Germany Ready to Help Eurozone Members,” Financial Times, February 18, 2009.

13 . T. Koukakis, “Josef Ackermann: The Secret 2010 Financial Support Plan for Greece and Why It Was Sunk,” http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=639539 .

14 . R. Zohlnhöfer and T. Saalfeld, eds., Politik im Schatten der Krise. Eine Bilanz der Regierung Merkel 2009–2013 (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2015).

15 . A. Tooze, “After the Wars,” review of The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West 1914–45 , by Heinrich August Winkler, London Review of Books 37.22 (2015), 15–17, December 7, 2017, https://www.lrb.co.uk/v37/n22/adam-tooze/after-the-wars .

16 . For the quote see I. Traynor, “Angela Merkel Dashes Greek Hopes of Rescue Bid,” Guardian, February 11, 2010.

17 . BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of June 30, 2009—2 BvE 2/08—paras. 1–421.

18 . “Merkel sagt Griechenland Milliarden-Hilfe zu’,” Die Welt, April 26, 2010; and “Union will Bankenbeteiligung prüfen,” Die Zeit, April 27, 2010.

19 . J. Schönenborn, “Griechenland-Hilfe nur mit Bankenbeteiligung,” April 4, 2010, ARD-DeutschlandTrend Mai 2010, www.tageschau.de .

20 . Bund der Steuerzahler, “Keine Steuerzahlergarantien ohne Bankenbeteiligung,” May 5, 2010, https://www.steuerzahler.de/ .

21 . W. Schäuble, “Why Europe’s Monetary Union Faces Its Biggest Crisis,” Financial Times, March 11, 2010; “Proposal for European Monetary Fund Wins EU Support,” Spiegel Online, March 8, 2010; and “Why Is Germany Talking About a European Monetary Fund?,” Economist, March 9, 2010.

22 . The second edition of the proposal from May 2010 is available at https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/2010/02/Nopercent20202percent20EMFpercent20e-versionpercent20updatepercent2017percent20May.pdf .

23 . M. Feldenkirchen, C. Reiermann, M. Sauga and H.-J. Schlamp, “Merkel Takes On the EU and Her Own Finance Minister,” Spiegel Online, March 22, 2010.

24 . “Issing zur Lage Griechenlands: IWF-Hilfe ist die einzige Alternative,” February 10, 2010, www.tagesschau.de ; and “Man muss den Griechen auf die Finger schauen,” March 2, 2010, www.deutschlandfunkkultur.de .

25 . Blustein, Laid Low , 26–31.

26 . IMF Country Report 13/156, May 20, 2013, written up dramatically by A. Evans-Pritchard, “IMF Admits Disastrous Love Affair with the Euro, Apologises for the Immolation of Greece,” Telegraph, July 28, 2016.

27 . “EZB warnt vor IWF-Hilfen für Griechenland,” FAZ, March 24, 2010.

28 . Papaconstantinou, Game Over, Kindle locations 1465–1470.

29 . C. Volkery, “Merkel’s Risky Hand of Brussels Poker,” Spiegel Online, March 26, 2010; and “Deutschland hilft den Griechen, wenn der IWF hilft,” FAZ, March 25, 2010.

30 . Gabor, “The Power of Collateral,” 23.

31 . D. Gabor and C. Ban, “Banking on Bonds: The New Links Between States and Markets,” Journal of Common Market Studies 54.3 (2016), 617–635.

32 . For a summary of the argument, see the case brought against the ECB in 2015 to the German supreme court “Verfassungsbeschwerde,” October 22, 2015, https://www.jura.uni-freiburg.de/de/institute/ioeffr3/forschung/papers/murswiek/verfassungsbeschwerde-qe-anleihenkaeufe-gauweiler.pdf .

33 . Gammelin and Löw, Europas Strippenzieher, 70.

34 . Papaconstantinou, Game Over, Kindle locations 1529–1536.

35 . J. White, “Emergency Europe,” Political Studies 63.2 (2015), 300–318.

36 . A. Evans-Pritchard, “Europe Agrees IMF-EU Rescue for Greece,” Telegraph, March 25, 2010.

37 . Papaconstantinou, Game Over, Kindle location 1677.

38 . “Irish Deficit Balloons After New Bank Bail-Out,” BBC News, September 30, 2010.

39 . H. Smith, “Super-Wealthy Investors Move Billions out of Greece,” Guardian, February 6, 2010; and F. Batzoglou, “Anxious Greeks Emptying Their Bank Accounts,” Spiegel Online, December 6, 2011.

40 . “Euro Zone Readies Giant Rescue Package for Greece,” Reuters, April 11, 2010.

41 . Evans-Pritchard, “Europe Agrees IMF-EU Rescue for Greece.”

42 . T. Barber, “Saving the Euro: Dinner on the Edge of the Abyss,” Financial Times, April 22, 2010.

43 . Bundesfinanzministerium, “Chronology: Stabilisation of the Economic and Monetary Union,” http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/EN/Standardartikel/Topics/Europe/Articles/2010-06-04-Chronologie-Euro-Stabilisierung.html?__act=renderPdf&__iDocId=199342 .

44 . K. Connolly, “Greek Debt Crisis: IMF Chief to Woo Germany over Bailout Deal,” Guardian, April 28, 2010.

45 . “Transcript of Statements to the Media by Angela Merkel and Strauss-Kahn in Berlin,” April 28, 2010, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/54/tr042810 .

46 . Bastasin, Saving Europe, 203.

47 . J. Pisani-Ferry, “Tim Geithner and Europe’s Phone Number,” Bruegel (blog), February 4, 2013.

48 . Papaconstantinou, Game Over, Kindle locations 2186–2188.

49 . “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zu den Hilfen für Griechenland,” May 5, 2010, https://www.bundesregierung.de/ContentArchiv/DE/Archiv17/Regierungserklaerung/2010/2010-05-05-merkel-erklaerung-griechenland.html . For the wider implications of TINA see A. Séville, “There Is No Alternative,” Politik zwischen Demokratie und Sachzwang (Frankfurt: Campus, 2017).

50 . “Deaths Place Greece on ‘Edge of Abyss,’” May 6, 2010, www.ekathimerini.com .

51 . Gabor, “The Power of Collateral,” 25.

52 . “Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010,” Report of the staffs of the CTFC and SEC to the Joint Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf .

53 . “Preliminary Findings Regarding the Market Events of May 6, 2010,” Report of the staffs of the CFTC and SEC to the Joint Advisory Committee on Emerging Regulatory Issues, https://www.sec.gov/sec-cftc-prelimreport.pdf .

54 . Bastasin, Saving Europe, 202.

55 . For this and the following see T. Barber, “Saving the Euro: Dinner on the Edge of the Abyss,” Financial Times , April 22, 2010.

56 . Barber, “Saving the Euro.”

57 . Bernanke, Courage to Act, 481. Bernanke held a private briefing of the Senate Banking Committee to ensure there was no negative reaction.

58 . Gammelin and R. Löw, Europas Strippenzieher, 75–86.

59 . Bastasin, Saving Europe, 214–215.

60 . Bastasin, Saving Europe, 218; Papaconstantinou, Game Over, Kindle location 2707.

61 . The IMF’s own devastating postmortem is IEO, The IMF and the Crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal (Washington, DC: IMF, 2016), 15–18.

62 . Blustein, Laid Low, 136.

63 . M. Blyth, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 73.

64 . “John Lipsky Biographical Information,” https://www.imf.org/external/np/omd/bios/jl.htm .

65 . Blustein, Laid Low, 64.

66 . Ibid., 139; and IMF, Greece: Staff Report on Request for Stand-By Arrangement (IMF Country Report No. 10/110, 2010).

CHAPTER 15: A TIME OF DEBT

1 . For this and the following, see http://www.foxnews.com/story/2010/02/12/glenn-beck-is-us-doomed-to-follow-greece-into-crisis.html .

2 . C. M. Reinhart and K. Rogoff, This Time Is Different, Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009); and C. M. Reinhart and K. S. Rogoff, “Growth in a Time of Debt” (NBER Working Paper 15639, 2010).

3 . J. Cassidy, “The Reinhart and Rogoff Controversy: A Summing Up,” New Yorker, April 26, 2013.

4 . C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff, “Why We Should Expect Low Growth Amid Debt,” Financial Times, January 28, 2010.

5 . “Germans Say Euro Zone May Have to Expel Greece: Poll,” Reuters, February 14, 2010.

6 . Irwin, The Alchemists, 237–238.

7 . G. Osborne, “The Threat of Rising Interest Rates Is a Greek Tragedy We Must Avoid,” Telegraph, December 21, 2009.

8 . P. Habbard, “The Return of the Bond Vigilantes,” March 7, 2012, http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/1203t_bond.pdf ; and S. Johnson, “Bond Fund Managers Brave ‘The Ring of Fire,’” Financial Times, February 7, 2010.

9 . A. Stratton, “Top Economists Attack Labour Plan to Tackle Britain’s Budget Deficit,” Guardian, February 14, 2010.

10 . Lord Skidelsky et al., “Letter: First Priority Must Be to Restore Robust Growth,” Financial Times, February 18, 2010.

11 . P. Wintour, “Mervyn King Shaped Tough Deficit Policy—But Was It Political Bias?,” Guardian, November 30, 2010.

12 . D. Laws, 22 Days in May: The Birth of the Lib Dem-Conservative Coalition (London: Biteback Publishing, 2010); and Irwin, The Alchemists, 244.

13 . P. Wintour, “Mervyn King: I Gave Nick Clegg No New Information on Debt Crisis,” Guardian, July 28, 2010.

14 . S. Wren-Lewis, “The Austerity Con,” London Review of Books 37, no. 4 (2015), 9–11.

15 . Irwin, The Alchemists, 248–249.

16 . P. Krugman, “More on Invisible Bond Vigilantes,” New York Times (blog), November 10, 2012.

17 . N. Watt, “David Cameron Makes Leaner State a Permanent Goal,” Guardian, November 12, 2013.

18 . ONS, “Statistical Bulletin: Public Sector Employment, UK: September 2016,” https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/publicsectorpersonnel/bulletins/publicsectoremployment/september2016 .

19 . T. Crewe, “The Strange Death of Municipal England,” London Review of Books 38, no. 24 (2016), 6–10. For a dramatic summary of the impact of austerity on the British welfare state see the essays in V. Cooper and D. Whyte, eds., The Violence of Austerity (London: Pluto Press, 2017).

20 . Clark, Hard Times, 180–191.

21 . Editorial, “The Risks and Rewards of George Osborne’s Austerity,” Financial Times, July 21, 2015.

22 . S. Stein, “Peter Orszag, Former Top Obama Adviser, Takes Issue with Portrayal in New Book,” Huffington Post, February 24, 2012, www.huffingtonpost.com .

23 . Kuttner, Presidency in Peril, 207.

24 . “Obama’s State of the Union Transcript 2010: Full Text,” Politico, January 27, 2010.

25 . P. Krugman, “Obama Liquidates Himself,” New York Times, January 26, 2010.

26 . J. Geraghty’s National Review blog quoted in “How the Austerity Class Rules Washington,” Nation, October 19, 2011.

27 . H. Yeager, “Circling Back on the Orszag Story,” Columbia Journalism Review 9 (January 2010).

28 . Bernanke, Courage to Act, 504; and L. Elliott, “It’s Too Soon for Austerity, Ben Bernanke Tells Congress,” Guardian, July 22, 2010.

29 . E. Luce, “US Deficit Key to Orszag Departure,” Financial Times, June 25, 2010.

30 . T. Skocpol and V. Williamson, The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

31 . G. C. Jacobson, “The Republican Resurgence in 2010,” Political Science Quarterly 126, no. 1 (2011), 27–52.

32 . S.-A. Mildner and J. Howald, “Jumping the Fiscal Cliff: The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy-Making under President Obama,” CESifo Forum (June 2013).

33 . T. E. Mann and N. J. Ornstein, It’s Even Worse Than It Looks: How the American Constitutional System Collided with the New Politics of Extremism (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 9–10.

34 . Q. Peel, “Merkel Spells Out €80bn Spending Cuts,” Financial Times, June 8, 2010.

35 . OECD, “Budget Deficits: What Governments Are Doing” (2010), http://www.oecd.org/germany/budgetdeficitswhatgovernmentsaredoing.htm .

36 . “German Government Agrees on Historic Austerity Program,” Spiegel Online, June 7, 2010.

37 . Peel, “Merkel Spells Out €80bn Spending Cuts.”

38 . D. Mara and A. Bowen, “German Government Unveils Unprecedented Austerity Plan,” Deutsche Welle, June 7, 2010.

39 . A. Beattie and Q. Peel, “Scene Set for G20 Battle over Fiscal Strategy,” Financial Times, June 24, 2010.

40 . W. Schäuble, “Maligned Germany Is Right to Cut Spending,” Financial Times, June 23, 2010.

41 . L. Summers and T. Geithner, “Our Agenda for the G-20,” Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2010.

42 . J. Calmes and S. Chan, “Leaders at Summit Turn Attention to Deficit Cuts,” New York Times, June 26, 2010.

43 . OECD, “Employment: Job Creation Must Be a Top Priority in Months Ahead, Says OECD’s Gurria,” July 7, 2010, http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/employmentjobcreationmustbeatoppriorityinmonthsaheadsaysoecdsgurria.htm .

44 . H. Zimmermann, “A Grand Coalition for the Euro: The Second Merkel Cabinet, the Euro Crisis and the Elections of 2013,” German Politics 23, no. 4 (2014): 322–336.

45 . Bastasin, Saving Europe, 221–235.